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ASSESSING METHODS FOR MEASURING RISK FOR MIGRATION AMONG YOUTH DUE TO VIOLENCE IN HONDURAS

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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN YOUTH VIOLENCE PREVENTION PROJECT

A Study to Assess Methods for Measuring Risk for Migration Among Youth due to Violence in Honduras

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Latin America and Caribbean Youth Violence Prevention (LAC YVP) project, implemented by the American Institutes for Research (AIR), operated a grants program in 2021. The grants provided funding to develop regional capacity in the LAC region to adopt, adapt, implement, and validate youth and violence risk assessment tools. These tools are designed to better identify program beneficiaries or examine broader youth needs in the community, monitor changes in risk level over time, and use data to inform strategic policy decisions.

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SUMMARY OF GRANT ACTIVITY

This study was developed by gathering, reviewing, and analyzing academic studies, NGO and government studies, program and assessment reports, and a series of databases related to violence and migration in Honduras and the region. Based on our review of these 207 works, we explore key frameworks to understand how violence affects migration dynamics, highlighting the usefulness and limitations of each framework in assessing Honduran migration.

Integrating concepts from various models explored in the literature review, a data framework was established to examine ways in which past and future researchers have and could operationalize these concepts in quantitative studies. Using the conceptual model to organize different studies' findings and relate them to one another and using the data framework to evaluate the reliability and applicability of each study´s findings, we present a comprehensive synthesis of findings and persisting knowledge gaps based on the body of extant quantitative studies on violence and irregular migration from Honduras.

Finally, based on our theoretical and data frameworks as well as a thorough review of 11 risk assessment tools and toolkits, we propose a tool and methodology for identifying

individuals, households, and communities at higher risk of being impacted by violence and migration.

MAIN FINDINGS

Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Violence on Migration

- The Capabilities and Intentions Framework provides a systemic approach to assessing the objective conditions, relationships, and characteristics that determine an individual's or household's capacity to migrate or stay (capability), and how an individual or household perceives their future and life opportunities (intentions).
- The Socio-Ecological Model depicts the multiple scales and temporalities through which violence impacts individual and collective development, and how people cope with violence.
- Violence can have a direct and indirect influence on migration, and it can function both as a driver and a trigger of migration.
- There are three pathways for youth migration as a response to violence. The first is transnational migration, which requires the capability to pay for the costs and to plan and prepare for the journey. The second one is internal migration and displacement, which is observed by looking at rural-urban migration driven by rural poverty or by looking at urban-urban migration which is driven by violent actors. The third possible path is staying in place, which might result from lack of connections in the community.

Extant Data Analysis

- There are three potential relationships between violence and migration: violence might cause migration, migration might cause violence, or other factors might cause both violence and migration.
- Hondurans' intent to migrate is mostly influenced by economic reasons and violence. Specifically, personal experiences of violence and threats trigger migration as well as changes in one's personal economic situation.
- Violence may contribute more heavily to emigration from urban areas of Honduras, while economic factors may be a more important influence on emigration from rural areas.
- Migrant networks are a key factor influencing Honduras's capacity to migrate, but likely play a smaller role in their intention to do so.

- Hondurans who are more engaged with their local communities—through home ownership, voting, or involvement in religious organizations—and those who feel their local governments are responsive to their needs are less likely to emigrate.
- Since several risk factors increase the probability both that Hondurans will experience violence and that they will migrate, programs addressing these factors may simultaneously reduce beneficiaries' risk of experiencing violence and their likelihood of migrating.

Landscape Review of Tools and Methods

Our study finds that the best tool to assess the risk of violence and migration in Honduras is the Migration Propensity Index (MPI):

- It determines the intentions of individuals, households, and communities to migrate
- It organizes factors into individual, community, and structural levels
- It has been validated with rigorous statistical exercises
- It has been applied in contexts similar to Honduras (Guatemala)
- It requires a short application time
- It includes 5 of the 10 risk factors and 3 of the 9 protective factors identified in our study

RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEXT STEPS

The MPI serves as the basis for building a tool that can be used in Honduras. In order to apply it, the following must be done:

- Add new factors to measure the risk of violence and migration
- Use this study as a starting point and, in general, a framework of capabilities and intentions to understand available data
- Incorporate mechanisms for community participation
- Develop the tool so that it is regularly applied

The recommended tool will successfully identify individuals, households, and communities that may need assistance in reducing their risk of violence and migration. In addition, this tool will help aid organizations better target and measure the effects of their interventions aimed at reducing the experiences that have left Honduran families with two difficult

options: migrate and try to find a more promising future, or stay and potentially become victims of violence, crime, or economic deprivation.

2. TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF VIOLENCE ON MIGRATION

INTRODUCTION

From 2014 to 2020, it is estimated that an average of 311,000 people left Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala each year, with the majority heading towards the United States (Congressional Research Service, 2021). While large numbers of Hondurans, Guatemalans, and Salvadorans have been migrating into the United States for decades, this most recent wave is distinct. Expanded immigration surveillance by the Mexican government and the territorial control exercised by powerful organized criminal groups have made migrants' journey northwards through Mexico more dangerous than ever before. These migrants risk kidnapping, extortion, assault, and rape along the migration path—mirroring violent threats that appear to be driving many migrants to risk the journey in the first place.

In response, Honduran migrants have formed large "caravans", searching for safety in numbers. This search for safety is especially acute because, unlike prior waves, this one is made up of growing numbers of women, families, and unaccompanied children. The role of violence and fear of violence in driving these people out of Honduras is also reflected in growing asylum applications. In recent years, a record number of Honduran migrants have turned themselves in to U.S. Border Patrol claiming the need for asylum. Between 2011 and 2016, there was a 166 percent increase of Hondurans seeking asylum compared to the previous 6 years ("Continued Rise in Asylum Denial Rates: Impact of Representation and Nationality", 2016). This has overwhelmed an immigration system that is not prepared to care for or process this quantity and these types of undocumented migrants.

While the COVID-19 pandemic and border closures across the region temporarily stemmed out-migration from Honduras and surrounding countries, the overall upward trend in migration appears to be continuing (Department of Homeland Security, 2021). Today, Hondurans constitute a large and growing proportion of the undocumented migrants attempting to cross the US southern border, which was not always the case. Between July 2018 and July 2021, 640,734 Hondurans were apprehended at the U.S. southwest border. This is equivalent to 19 percent of total apprehensions. Among the Hondurans apprehended between 2018 and 2021, 367,361 were individuals part of a family unit, 69,168 single minors, 168 accompanied minors, and 204,035 single adults ("Southwest Land Border Encounters", 2021). Between 2013 and 2020, 41% of apprehended migrants were women and 59% were men (USAID, 2021). Unlike its neighbors Guatemala and El Salvador, Honduras never experienced a massive armed conflict, which through the 1970s and 80s drove hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans and Guatemalans into Mexico and the United States. These earlier

waves seeded large and growing diaspora communities which benefited from 1980s U.S. legalization programs that allowed them to apply for and extend legal status to family members newly arrived or still living in their home country.

In contrast, large-scale migration from Honduras did not develop until the late 1990s and early 2000s, much of it spurred by the devastation brought by Hurricane Mitch in 1998. Unable to legalize their status at the same rate as Salvadorans and Guatemalans, Honduran flows to the United States have been proportionally more "illegal", and, relative to the size of the diasporic population, more Hondurans have been deported since 1980 than any other migrant group. In 2011, for example, more than three-quarters of Hondurans in the United States were believed to lack legal migration status, the largest share among all Central American immigrant groups. Nevertheless, over the last two decades, relative to its size, migrants from Honduras have comprised the fastest-growing population of Central Americans in the United States.

Research on the root causes of Honduran migration shows that in- and out-migration from Honduras is driven by a number of factors, the most significant of which are: poverty, lack of economic opportunity and social exclusion; violence and insecurity; weak governance and institutional corruption; environmental degradation and natural disasters; and growing diasporic networks in the United States that provide essential support for would-be migrants before, during, and after the journey northwards. Within this mix of migration-driving causes and conditions, particular forms of violence appear to play a central role. As we discuss in more depth below, we focus on manifestations of *societal violence*: *criminal* violence such as murder, assault, extortion, and gang recruitment; and gender-based violence such as sexual abuse and rape. Fear of such violence, coupled with a pervading sense that the government is unable and even unwilling to protect its most vulnerable citizens, seems to play an important role in pushing Hondurans, particularly Honduran youth, to migrate (Kennedy, 2014).

According to homicide statistics, Honduras' homicide rate peaked in 2012, and while the homicide rate has declined since then, Honduras remains among the top five countries with the highest homicide rates globally. In 2021, Honduras had the third-highest homicide rate in Latin America and the Caribbean (38.6 per 100,000 people) (Insight Crime, 2022). This violence has a particularly acute impact on Honduran youth. In 2021, four of ten Honduran murder victims were between the ages of 15 and 29. In the same year, while the nationwide murder rate was 44.7 per 100,000, the rate for men ages 20–24 was 142.3, and 170 for men ages 25-29 (*Sistema Estadístico Policial en Línea (SEPOL)*, 2022). Clearly, high levels of violence have a profound impact on Honduran life and development, particularly for youth. But how does such violence interact with other major factors driving out-migration? What types of violence have the most profound direct impacts on Honduran migration? What personal and communal resources dictate how Honduran youth respond to experiences with violence?m

This project aims to identify and assess the impact of violence on Honduran migration patterns, and works towards developing a tool to help policymakers and service providers target interventions to best assist those communities most vulnerable to violence-induced migration. In this review of scholarly literature, we will highlight several key frameworks and concepts for approaching the relationship between violence and migration in the Honduran context. A fuller understanding of the impact of violence on migration requires taking into consideration several key issues.

First, in general, an individual's or household's decision to migrate out of their country is shaped by a wide variety of conditions and connections both at home and in the destination country. These "push and pull" factors include relative health of labor markets and access to job security. For example, a head of household who cannot find work at home will be "pulled" to the United States by reports about the high wages and decent working conditions from kin who have already migrated there. Attention to such conditions helps us understand the general dynamics of migration from Honduras to the United States (as well as other destination countries).

But to understand how and why certain Honduran individuals, households, or communities decide to migrate, we must look beneath the broader economic, political, and social conditions to assess the specific resources potential migrants draw on to make migration possible. For example, most Honduran migrants rely upon the key resources of social and kin networks that link them to their destination country and can provide them with the means to travel more safely and some stability upon arrival. By focusing on individual, household-level, and communal resources, and social networks, the "Capital and Social Exclusion Framework" (Kothari, 2002) provides a starting point for this kind of analysis.

Second, Honduras' long history and contemporary struggle with violence has affected every realm of social, economic, and political development The pervasive presence of violence in public life corrodes trust in government, slows economic growth, diminishes social networks, and reduces hope in a better future (Olson et al., 2021). In some communities and households where gender-based and domestic violence takes place, violence can also be a constant refrain within the home itself. The prevalence of such long-term exposure means that insecurity and violence act as a key push factor (or driver) of out-migration, enmeshed and working in tandem with other powerful push factors like widespread poverty, government corruption, and the effects of climate change. Exposure to violence also tends to amplify the influence of less tangible and more subjective push factors like communal alienation and mistrust, family disintegration, and a pervasive sense of hopelessness about the future.

Long-term exposure to violence may be an important push factor for migration. Discreet or personal experiences with violence, such as being a victim, a victim's family member, a bystander or a witness may be an event that *triggers* migration. A trigger is an *event* that

provokes an individual, household or members of a given community to attempt to migrate. When considering the impact of violence on Honduran migration, it is essential to track and understand how violence as a driver and violence as trigger each affect Hondurans' willingness and ability to migrate transnationally, how they interact with each other, and how they interact with other factors driving out-migration.

Violence impacts both generalized conditions driving migration as well as the more granular decision-making processes Honduran households undergo vis-à-vis migration. However, it is important to not simply link violence and migration as "cause" and "effect". High levels of out-migration *and* high levels of societal violence can both be thought of as responses to historical and structural factors that have shaped Honduras. Below, we explore key conceptual starting points for analyzing how violence and migration relate to one another, to the wider national context, and in Hondurans' social networks. To capture how violence works across multiple scales and temporalities, we draw on the *Socio-Ecological Model of Human Development* (Bronfenbrenner, 1989; Campie, Hill, Dias, Garcia Lozano & Mizrahi, 2021) and explore how the concept of *chronic violence* applies to violence's *direct and indirect* impacts on out-migration.

Third and finally, understanding the relationship between violence and migration requires assessing more than just the *objective* conditions and household characteristics that determine people's capacity to withstand violence or to migrate. It also requires assessing people's subjective perceptions of the threat of violence and the perceived future in store for those who stay or those who go. That is, long-term exposure to or acute experiences with violence will have distinct effects on different households depending on a complex set of objective characteristics and subjective interpretations. As explored below, by considering individual and communal perceptions and desires, the Intention-Capabilities Framework (de Hass, 2011) provides a starting point for assessing how subjective interpretations of violence, of conditions at home and abroad, and a number of other characteristics affect how Hondurans respond to violence and under what circumstances Hondurans migrate.

We expand on these insights with an overview of applied theories and frameworks for exploring the impact of violence on internal displacement within and irregular migration out of Honduras. We have reviewed 207 qualitative and quantitative studies examining migration, violence, and the relationship between them. A list of these studies are in an annotated bibliography that will be made available to the public. However, given the task at hand, we believe an exhaustive review of these studies here would not be most helpful. Towards that end, this literature review will provide a more targeted examination of the studies we found most insightful and helpful in understanding the dynamics of violence and forced migration as they play out in the unique context of contemporary Honduras.

In Part 1, we analyze three key frameworks that are essential for understanding how violence affects migration dynamics: Push-Pull models; the "Capital and Exclusion"

Framework; and the Intention-Capabilities Framework. We highlight the usefulness and limitations of each in assessing Honduran migration.

Part 2 provides a brief overview of conceptual tools for understanding the impact of violence on Honduran society. We examine how scholars have characterized *societal violence* and draw on the conceptual framework of the *Social-Ecological Model* to explore the multiple scales and temporalities through which violence impacts individual and collective development, and how people cope with violence.

In Part 3, we explore scholarly work on the relationship between violence and migration. We examine efforts to measure violence's direct and indirect influence on migration, and how it functions as both driver and trigger of migration. This section ends with a brief discussion of methodological challenges of understanding the relative impact of specific types of violence on people's capacity and intention to migrate and provides some preliminary conclusions about how we might begin to address these challenges.

PART I: THREE FRAMEWORKS FOR UNDERSTANDING IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN HONDURAS

Push-Pull Theories of Migration

The most widely used approach to the causes of migration is that of *push-pull theories*, which are based, both implicitly and explicitly, on gravity models rooted in functionalist social theory. Functionalist social theory frames society as a system which is an aggregate of interdependent parts with a tendency towards equilibrium. Based on this perspective, people are expected to move from low-income to high-income areas. The idea that migration is a function of spatial disequilibria, dominant since the late 18th century (Ravenstein, 1885), is the foundation of "push-pull" models that inform most contemporary migration modeling as well as common-sense and non-specialist thinking about migration.

Modeling migration along these lines generally involves compiling a list of economic, social, and political factors deemed to induce individuals to leave their native region or country and balancing it against similar lists forcing them to stay or go (Jerome, 1926; Mayda, 2010). It has been used most by scholars assessing labor migration, based on the notion of unlimited supplies of labor in sending communities, and upon the existence of a permanent large differential of demand in favor of receiving areas. Analysts of professional emigration, for instance, have compiled polar lists of incentives—known as *differentials of advantage*, to explain the causes of the brain drain from certain countries (Portes & Böröcz, 1989). Drawing heavily on economic theories of supply and demand to assess how

macro-conditions in sending and receiving countries structure migration flows, push-pull migration theories have been adapted to account for a wide variety of social and political factors beyond economic considerations. Scholars have contrasted large refugee flows with labor migrations by describing the greater importance of "push" factors in the former in comparison with the latter (Zimmerman, 1996). The model has also been expanded to consider housing prices, climate and weather, environmental hazards and pollution, and a host of other factors (Graves, 1980; Hunter, 2003).

In the context of Honduran migration, the extreme inequalities between labor markets in terms of levels of unemployment, wages, and working conditions between the United States and Honduras mean that Hondurans will be "pushed" out of Honduras by the widespread lack of jobs, low wages and poor working conditions and "pulled" to the United States by the prospect of more employment opportunities offering far higher wages and better working conditions. There is no doubt that such dynamics play a powerful role in driving youth migration. Among Hondurans between the ages of 15 and 24, nearly three in ten are neither employed nor in school ("Youth labor statistics", 2020). Similar differentials in levels of security and stability, environmental health, access to education, and a variety of other comparative factors provide a partial understanding of why many people in Honduras and the region migrate to the United States. Table 1 below highlights how push and pull dynamics operate in terms of relative security, economic opportunities, environmental issues, and family connections.

PUSH PULL FACTORS	
PUSH	PULL
Persecution, violence, and war	Safety, stability, and freedom
Poor wages and lack of jobs	Higher wages, more job prospects
Crop failure, famine, pollution, natural disasters	Food availability, better environment
Limited opportunities, lack of services, family separation	Better quality of life, availability of services, family reunification

Push-Pull Factors Table (Justice for Immigrants) [1]

However, the Push-Pull model has important limitations. As Rumbaut and Portes (2001) argue, its focus on labor demand in receiving countries means that it tends to emphasize the "pull" over the "push", particularly in terms of that exercised by receiving economies. More

[1] Copied from https://justiceforimmigrants.org/what-we-are-working-on/immigration/root-causes-of-migration/

importantly, migration scholars increasingly critique it as "static", and insufficient for assessing constantly shifting dynamics that govern migration in an increasingly globalized world (Malmberg, 2021; De Haas, 2010). The Push-Pull framework fails to explain why, for instance, countries and regions in the less developed world featuring comparable levels of under-employment and poverty produce very different migration streams (Massey et al., 1993). Some are sources of sizable flows while, in others, the population stays put. Since all such areas are subject to the same equilibrium-restoring pressures, the theory leaves unexplained why these empirical differences exist. Likewise, as extensive data on migration out of Honduras and many other countries seems to show, the same contradictions exist at the sub-national level (USAID, 2020).

In addition, by dividing relevant migration drivers into conditions in either sending countries or receiving countries, this framework sets up something of a false dichotomy in a globalizing economy that has made migration a basic tool of survival for poor communities all over the world (Van Hear et al., 2018). As Mcdowell and de Haan write, members of a household in which someone migrates who stay put are as "enmeshed in migratory processes as migrants themselves, and their decision to remain is likely to be elemental in household migration-related decision-making" (McDowell and de Haan, 1997, p. 34). That is, the Push-Pull model forces us to imagine conditions in one place (Honduras) pushing migrants out while conditions that exist in another place (United States) pull them onward. However, the decision to migrate is oftentimes driven by household and community-level dynamics and is part of more localized strategies to cope with or resolve problems internal to the household or community. At the same time, there are also significant risks for Hondurans who migrate that the Push-Pull model cannot account for. The route through Mexico and into the United States has become more expensive over the last 20 years. The costs are high, but there are also the risks of being caught, deported, or killed. The pull-push analysis does not take this into account, which may be a large part of the equation. Finally, given that Hondurans have been migrating out of the country in great numbers for generations, and that migration to the United States has become part of Honduran "culture", imagining Honduras and the United States as entirely separate spaces is misleading.

Most importantly for our purposes, on its own, the Push-Pull model is not useful for assessing more nuanced and complex migration dynamics, particularly at the sub-national level, because of its reliance on reductionist and materialist economic analysis when accounting for migration (Todaro, 1976), that fails to consider clear empirical disparities in migration flows. Why do some individuals, households and even regions have similar push and pull profiles but have very different levels of migration? Such questions require approaches that can go beyond measured conditions in the sending and receiving countries to analyze how these conditions affect kinds of people, households, and communities, and in turn the decision-making processes they undergo when considering the prospect of migration. For example, a Honduran household considering migration might hesitate on account of an elderly mother who needs round-the-clock care. Or a young person might

decide not to migrate because they are trying to finish their education, are part of a thriving faith community, and do not want to abandon either.

The next two frameworks provide pathways to a more nuanced understanding of how local and global conditions interact with potential migrants' characteristics and decision-making processes.

Social Capital and Exclusion

Sociological and economic theories of human capital were initially developed to understand the origins and persistence of poverty within and between nations (Warren et al., 2001). Scholars of migration, particularly labor migration, have adapted the concept of human capital to theorize why people migrate and how potential migrants leverage kinds of capital (i.e., personal, and collective resources) to make migration possible and to prosper (Borjas, 1999). This approach brings into focus the role of *social networks*, people's degree of *embeddedness* in their home community, and their level of access to (and exclusion from) crucial resources in driving migration flows. Researchers of migration have increasingly used the "Social Capital and Exclusion" framework to try to understand how and why specific subsets of a national population choose to migrate while others do not (Kothari, 2002; Massey, 1992). Through this framework, migration is understood as a "central livelihood strategy" (Moore, 2001) among many others for poor households seeking prosperity or who may be fleeing violence.

To capture how and why some individuals and households from migrant-sending communities go while others stay, research on the linkages between poverty and migration have adopted an analytical framework based on the concept of "social exclusion". Social exclusion captures an important dimension of the experience of certain groups of being somehow 'set apart' or 'locked out' of participation in some aspects of social life "…such that a focus on exclusionary processes…draws attention to the production of disadvantage through the active dynamics of social interaction, rather than through anonymous processes of impoverishment and marginalization" (Kabeer 2000, p.3).

Capital refers to a variety of resources. These may include economic, political, personal, and communal resources that individuals and households can draw on in their livelihood strategies and their participation in their community and society. The most important types of capital, as outlined in Uma Kothari's (2002: 13) table below, include: social, cultural and identity, human, geographical, economic, and political.

POVERTY-RELATED CAPITALS AND FORMS OF EXCLUSION		
POVERTY-RELATED CAPITAL	DISCURSIVE CATEGORIES	FORMS OF EXCLUSION
Social	Networks Contacts Affiliations (union, labor, gangs, religious, etc.) Community based organizations	Participation in social, 'community' life, social isolation; rules and norms
Cultural and Identity	Identity: Ethnicity, caste, class, tribe, religion, gender Cultural capital: education, knowledge, language, skills	Elements of injustice; social patterns of representation, interpretation and communication; cultural-devaluation disadvantage (Kabeer 2000:6); structural inequalities.
Human	Education Knowledge and skills Life stage: elderly and children Disability Illness Household size and structure	Discrimination and disadvantage of certain groups through social and cultural representations and limited access to economic opportunities, social services.
Geographical	Remote rural Urban Natural environment	Unequal distribution of resources and services
Economic: assets and resources	Ownership of property and productive capital (land, cattle); savings	Exploitation, marginalization, deprivation, unequal distribution of resources and assets
Political	Decision-making Participation Patronage	Denied participation in political life; exploitation by elites and intermediaries

An individual's or household's access to and control over these forms of capital will determine their level of "inclusion" (or exclusion) in each community, society, or developmental process.

Exclusion can take many diverse, overlapping, and mutually reinforcing forms. In studies of chronic poverty, for example," social exclusion implies that there is a downward spiral in which labor market marginality leads to poverty and social isolation, which in turn reinforce the risk of long-term unemployment" (Gallie et al., 2003, p. 6).

This framework's utility is in parsing out the heterogeneity of livelihood strategies used by people who find themselves in similar socio-economic situations by assessing their

resources, specific economic and socio-relational context, and particular forms of exclusion and vulnerabilities that shape their world. This is important, because though migration has become a central livelihood strategy for millions of people, potential migrants' ability, and willingness to migrate are "facilitated or constrained by relations within and between the institutions of household, community, state and market" (Moore, 2001, p. 6). As Kothari (2001, p.12) writes:

> "There are those whose social, cultural, economic, and political exclusion makes them unable to move (potential migrants) and those who choose not to move (committed non-migrants) and who subsequently stay put albeit in an environment characterized by out-migration. Thus, not everyone is similarly mobile for a range of reasons which include lack of knowledge about other places and opportunities outside the confines of their own geographical and cultural environment, social and cultural ties which bind them to their home place, physical immobility, gender, and age."

In our opinion, the Capital-and-Exclusion Framework has two key strengths that make it useful for assessing how and why Hondurans migrate, and how violence plays into the migration process. First, it provides researchers with a means of naming (and potentially measuring) personal, household, and communal resources migrants draw from when they attempt to migrate, as well as a potential roadmap for identifying individual and household characteristics that make youth vulnerable to violence and likely to need to migrate in response to such violence. These resources, as we explore in more depth below, go beyond economic wealth to include a wide variety of characteristics including those related to age, geography, education, job skills, and ethnicity. Second, it brings into focus the importance of migrants' social networks in driving migration patterns. That is, by paying close attention to people's level of inclusion or exclusion in their home community as well as in their social and kin networks in potential receiving areas, this framework can help researchers understand how migrants' and potential migrants' *embeddedness* in such networks affects their ability to migrate, to stay put, and even to withstand exposure to or experiences of violence.

This helps us understand how certain groups face deepening spirals of exclusion that can permanently impair their ability to develop new forms of capital. Such self-perpetuating processes are particularly acute for poor Honduran youth and suggest an important connection between social exclusion, youth violence, and youth migration. Likewise,

particularly in the context of Honduras, high levels of social exclusion faced by some poor youth is widely cited as a key factor driving youth violence, gang growth, and involvement in illicit markets (Berkman, 2007; Rivera, 2013; Stinchcomb & Hershberg, 2014; Umaña, 2018). According to research conducted since 2010 assessing the rapid increase in unaccompanied youth migrating from Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, seeking more opportunities also appears to be a crucial factor driving high rates of youth migration (Stinchcomb & Hershberg; 2014).

These insights have also helped explain the "non-linear" relationship between political and economic development and out-migration. Contrary to the expectations of classic push-pull theories, as poor and middle-income countries develop more prosperous labor markets and more educated populations, out-migration to richer countries tends to **increase** in the short term due to people's increased levels of capital, wider and more varied social networks, and higher expectations about their potential futures. This can make migration possible and desirable for those previously locked out of such livelihood strategies (de Haas, 2010).

Furthermore, the concept of social exclusion provides a useful means of identifying those categories of youth likely to be vulnerable to violence and consequently more likely to be forced to migrate, internally or transnationally, in response to violence. In Honduras, for example, recent studies have shown that female youth, who suffer disproportionately from gender-related violence and victimization and are generally less able to seek state protection than their male counterparts, are also more likely to intend to migrate than male youth (Creative Associates, 2019). Likewise, Honduran youth who identify as LGBTQ also tend to suffer high levels of social exclusion, making them less able to access communal and state resources that might otherwise provide them with some protection from violence. Other characteristics linked to social capital and social exclusion can dictate a young person's vulnerability to violence and ability to migrate. For example, the rural poor in Honduras generally have far less access to institutional assistance in terms of medical care, security and other services than their urban counterparts. This helps explain high levels of ongoing rural to urban migration, processes that can often precede an individual's or household's decision to migrate transnationally.

However, this framework also has some key weaknesses. For one, its focus on migrant *resources* fails to adequately consider how individuals and households in possession of such resources perceive their personal advantages and disadvantages and how they leverage their resources under distinct conditions. Put another way, it is hyper-focused upon objectively assessed characteristics, resources and connections that enable individuals to migrate but fails to consider the diverse and sometimes contradictory ways that humans perceive and interpret their living conditions, life chances, and the potential futures they imagine for themselves and their loved ones at home or abroad. As Parnwell observed, "…movements generally take place in response to the circumstances, *actual as well as potential and*

perceived, with which people are faced both in their home communities and in areas away from home." (Parnwell 1993, p.71). To take account of how subjective interpretations play into the migration process, i.e., how "the potential and perceived" affects migrant decision-making, we turn to the third and final framework.

The Capabilities-Intentions Framework

The third and final framework reviewed here, dubbed the Capabilities-Intentions Framework (Haas, 2010), developed out of scholarly efforts to critique, and improve the gravity ("push-pull") and neo-economic analyses of migrants' decision-making processes. This framework incorporates and builds on the previous two approaches in several important ways. First, it puts migrant agency front and center by drawing on Amartya Sen's (1999) definition of development "as the process of expanding the substantive freedoms that people enjoy" and his operationalization of "freedoms" as expansions of "human capability ", which "…refers to the ability of human beings to lead lives they have reason to value, and to enhance the substantive choices they have" (Sen 1997, p. 1959). Focusing on migrant's capabilities creates room to consider key non-economic factors driving migration more fully, such as education and health; various (gender, ethnic, etc.) inequalities; personal and political freedoms; and, most importantly for our purposes, violence and insecurity as migration determinants (de Haas, 2010). In this sense, capabilities refer both to the diverse forms of capital (geographical, social, etc.) outlined above as well as to people's ability to leverage these resources towards different ends.

The other key strength of this framework is its focus on the impact of culture, education and access and exposure to forms of information on people's willingness to migrate. It also includes factors like potential migrants' understanding of what staying put or leaving might mean for themselves and their social networks. In this framework, "aspirations" refers to people's notions of the good life and how they might attain it as well as their awareness and perception of opportunities elsewhere (de Haas, 2010). As de Haas writes, "People will only migrate if they perceive better opportunities elsewhere and have the capabilities to move. Although this assertion implies choice and agency, it also shows that this agency is constrained by historically determined conditions which create concrete opportunity structures" (*Ibid*, pg 16).

By providing a systematic approach to assessing not only the objective conditions, relationships, and characteristics that determine an individual's or household's capacity to migrate or stay, but also how an individual or household perceives their future and life chances, this framework has the potential to provide a more nuanced picture of how migrant agency and structural conditions interact. It includes potential migrants' subjective determination of vulnerability and imagined costs and benefits of staying or leaving, bringing

their agency, resources, and connections into conversation with their assessment and interpretations of the economic, social, and political conditions both at home and in their potential destination. As De Haas writes:

> "The ensemble of structural conditions creates complex *opportunity structures*, endowing different individuals and social groups with different sets of negative and positive freedoms, which, depending on how these constellations affect their capabilities and aspirations, may or may not make them decide to migrate." (de Haas 2010, p.10)

We believe this framework is the most complete and provides a starting point for assessing the impact of violence on Honduran migration. However, we take issue with the term "aspirations". Merriam Webster defines "aspiration" as "a strong desire to achieve something high or great." In the context of irregular migration from Honduras and the high levels of desperation driving most migrants to attempt the dangerous and difficult journey to the United States, "aspirations" is far too hopeful a term to capture the sacrifices and often painful cost-benefit calculations that most Honduran migrants must make as they consider and undertake a migration journey. Rather than use the term "aspiration" to describe potential migrants' willingness and desire to migrate, we have instead chosen to use "**intentions**" to designate Hondurans' willingness and desire to migrate. Using this term also has the added benefit of linking to robust quantitative data sources assessing Hondurans' "intention to migrate", which researchers have found to be a useful indicator, in specific countries, for predicting future migration patterns (Creighton, 2013; De Jong and Gordon, 1999). A recent study by the Migration Policy Institute has also added valuable nuance for assessing the relationship between potential migrants' intentions and their capacity to make it happen by measuring intentions across three indicators: desire, plans, and preparations. The study found that, while a relatively large percentage of Central American respondents voiced the "desire" to migrate, only a small fraction of these respondents had made concrete plans to do so, and only a fraction of those who had made plans had in fact made preparations to migrate (i.e., organizing and expanding their resources) (Ruiz Soto, et al., 2021) .

However, simply naming and considering migrant agencies and subjective calculations does not necessarily make measuring them possible. Taking account of Hondurans' subjective considerations of the potential future in store if they stay in Honduras or if they migrate means dealing with some rather vague concepts that resist quantification. As Carling (2014, p. 5) writes, "…in societies where a large proportion of the population wishes to be

elsewhere, this desire is a fundamental aspect of society that affects its life and development". In Honduras, for instance, 30-plus years of multi-generational migration to the United States means that the "American Dream" is a solid and fundamental aspect of life and life expectations in Honduran society. But only some Hondurans have the capabilities to achieve it, even if via undocumented migration. Likewise, Hondurans' intention to migrate appears to be linked to the relative level of "hope" they have in their communities and country's future improvement.

To summarize, the above review of theories for and approaches to analyzing migration has led to several insights.

1. Push-pull migration theories help us to name and assess the major macro forces driving overall migration patterns, particularly in terms of migration that is primarily structured by labor opportunities. It also can provide a useful starting point for understanding the conditions and forces shaping individual, household, and communal level intentions to migrate, but it fails to explain very different patterns from countries or regions with very similar push and pull circumstances or consider migrant resources and capability to migrate.

2. The Capital and Social Exclusion Framework provides a useful set of concepts for categorizing the kinds of resources potential migrants must draw from in order to make migration possible and brings into focus the importance of social networks in shaping people's ability to stay in their home community or migrate. However, it does not make room for assessing how migrants perceive and interpret their personal advantages and disadvantages, or how they choose to leverage their resources.

3. The Capability and Intention approach builds on the prior two frameworks by considering the resources that potential migrants can draw from and the ways they leverage these resources. It also brings migrant agencies front and center by focusing on how potential migrants perceive and interpret conditions at home and abroad, and act upon these observations.

PART II: SOCIETAL VIOLENCE

As discussed in the introduction, Honduras' long history and contemporary struggle with violence has affected every realm of social, economic, and political development. This has made violence a key "push-factor" of out-migration, enmeshed and working in tandem with other powerful push factors. At the same time, direct experiences with violence can be a significant event that "*triggers*" migration. Thus, violence impacts both generalized

conditions driving migration as well as the more granular decision-making processes Honduran households undergo vis-à-vis migration.

It is important to understand violence's multiple and wide-ranging effects that include but go beyond driving out-migration. Scholarly discussion of violence is vast and multi-faceted, encompassing a wide variety of theories and concepts that are beyond the scope of this paper. Because of the historical and structural context of Honduras, we will focus on manifestations of what scholars and practitioners name *societal violence*. This is defined as any type of violence committed by individuals or the community that has a social impact. In this section, we will focus on three dimensions of societal violence that are particularly important in the Honduran context: criminal violence (gang violence, extrajudicial state violence, assault, robbery, etc.), gendered violence (from physical and psychological abuse to rape), and domestic violence (spousal and parent-to-child physical aggression) (Tremblay et al., 2021).[2]

We start with a summary of how violence impacts developmental processes at multiple scales through the *Socio-Ecological Model of Human Development* and consider how the concept of chronic violence relates to the long-term impact of societal violence on out-migration. We then highlight scholarly research on societal violence's direct and indirect impacts on migration and discuss the methodological challenges in assessing violence as a trigger for migration.

Violence in the Socio-Ecological Model of Human Development

In Honduras, as we explore in more depth in subsequent sections of this report, historical and structural forces over the last 40 years have given rise to a national context in which, large, though unevenly distributed, swathes of the population are vulnerable to the threat of violence and many are induced to migrate to find prosperity and security. To understand how particular individuals, households, and communities navigate this context, and what surviving under such conditions means, some of the most nuanced studies draw on some version of Bronfenbrenner's (1979) Socio-Ecological Model of Human Development (SEM), in which human development is characterized as a self-contained ecological system in which:

[2] We will not however delve into other important conceptions of violence such as "structural violence" (Galtung 196X)—the violence embedded in socio-economic and political structures—or "symbolic violence" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Zizek, 2008)—the ways that structural violence becomes embedded in social relations between groups and in marginalized populations' consciousness.

"…personal, social and political aspects of a person's development are inseparable and integral to one other. The ecological framework, furthermore, shows how people develop in constant interaction with local, national, and global actors, structures, institutions, beliefs, and cultures, all of which mutually influence and depend on one other." (Bronfenbrenner, 1989; Campie, Hill, Dias, Garcia Lozano & Mizrahi, 2021).

Thus, seen through this frame, national, communal, and individual development are all linked through constant exchange across multiple levels. However, when the macro-structures within which development is supposed to occur create a context of extreme and long-term insecurity, this violence also moves and spreads throughout the social system in ways that make its multiple effects difficult to fully comprehend. The SEM provides a useful starting point for analyzing how violence works through and across multiple scales. Scholars have defined these scales in various ways. The diagram below provides a simplified and useful breakdown of how scholars and policymakers have come to understand different scales of development provided by the SEM, how violence operates at distinct scales, and how violence prevention efforts can intervene at the different levels (Campie, Hill, Dias, Garcia Lozano & Mizrahi; 2021).



A Closer Look at Each Level of the SEM

INDIVIDUAL: Identifies biological and personal history factors such as age, education, income substance use or history of abuse that increases the likelihood of becoming a victim or perpetrator of violence.

RELATIONAL: Examines relationships that may increase the risk of experiencing violence as a victim or perpetrator. A person's closest social circle - peers, partners and family members - influences their behavior and contributes to their range of experience.

COMMUNITY: Explores the settings such as schools, workplaces and neighborhoods, in which social relationships occur and seeks to identify the characteristics of these settings that are associated with the risk of of becoming a victim or perpetrator of violence.

SOCIETAL: Looks at the broad societal factors such as health, economic, educational and social policies that help create a climate in which violence is encouraged or inhibited and that help maintain economic or social inequalities among groups in society.

Scholars of societal violence have drawn on the SEM's scalar approach to developing a more nuanced understanding of the specific ways people are vulnerable to violence, and their ability to seek and find protection. Key here is the concept of resilience. As Ungar writes, "Resilience is the capacity of individuals to navigate their way to health-sustaining resources, including opportunities to experience feelings of well-being and a condition of the

individual's family, community and culture to provide these health resources and experiences in culturally meaningful ways" (Ungar, 2008, p.225).

Attention to how violence impacts individual, household, communal and societal development is helpful for understanding the cascading impacts of violence in Honduran society. The country's long-term struggle with high rates of criminal violence and the state's inability to meaningfully protect large swathes of the population has had a deeply corrosive effect on collective development. This is what J.V Pearce termed "chronic violence," defined as a context in which:

1. Rates of violent death are at least twice the average for the country income category established by the World Bank.
2. These levels are sustained for five years or more.
3. Acts of violence not necessarily resulting in death are recorded at high levels across several socialization spaces, such as the household, the neighborhood and the school, contributing to further reproduction of violence over time (Pearce, 2007)

In her seminal study of chronic violence in Latin America, Adams identifies its multiple overlapping causes. These include:

> "Extreme poverty and growing perceptions of social inequality; historical legacies of conflict and violence; forced migration and displacement; the persistent weaknesses of many "new" democracies and security-oriented political reforms that have fallen short or failed; organized crime and illicit trade; the socially destructive impacts of prevailing urbanization policies; certain forms of economic development, as well as climate change and environmental destruction." (Adams, 2017)

The takeaway point here is that exposure to chronic violence corrodes development at every level of society and across multiple scales of development. Once again, however, categories of youth find themselves more vulnerable to violence and less able to access protective factors that might reduce their intent to migrate and therefore respond in distinct ways to the threat of violence. For example, poor male youth residing in violent urban areas dominated by gangs or other criminal actors are often forced to choose between joining a gang for self-protection or migrating out of the community. Poor female youth in similar

contexts find themselves even more vulnerable than their male counterparts, as they are more likely to be subject to gender-based violence perpetrated not only by criminal actors but also by intimate partners or members of their own household. Over the last several years, rates of gender-related violence against women have starkly increased in Honduras and over time such trends have sharpened female youth's sense of vulnerability and their desire to migrate. In this sense, young Honduran women are increasingly likely to be exposed to multiple forms of violence threatening their development at every scale of the Socio-Ecological Framework, making out-migration appear as the only viable option for survival. Similarly, LGBTQ Hondurans have long found themselves disproportionately targeted as victims of violence and simultaneously locked out of accessing communal networks and government institutions that might provide some protection (Kids in Need of Defense; Latin America Working Group; Women's Refugee Commission, 2018).

Long-term exposure to such violence, particularly for Honduran society's most vulnerable populations, creates a cruel self-reinforcing cycle. Victimization further undermines people's capacity to build and maintain constructive social relations, attenuating the social networks that are key for their ability to live and prosper in their home community. More broadly, the concept of chronic violence helps us understand how, in the Honduran context, long-term exposure to deep insecurity can act as a potent driver of out-migration. It is worth taking a moment to explore the ways that scholars have explained this.

PART III: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VIOLENCE AND MIGRATION

Violence as Migration-Driver

Experiencing or being exposed to violence in the long-term can have a deeply corrosive effect on people's embeddedness in their country, community, and even household, weakening the bonds that are crucial for keeping people in place by meaningfully linking them to their social networks in their home community and country. Fear and paranoia undermine and attenuate constructive social relations, fragmenting people's ability to act in solidarity against perceived threats (Offit & Cook, 2010). The loss of trust can destroy the social relations that keep people involved in and supported by their community. Social networks tend to shrink as people seek protection in smaller and smaller "in-groups", and generalized fear creates a pervasive "social silence" (Green, 1998) as people erect social and physical walls against strangers, isolating themselves in their homes and in walled communities (Caldeira, 2000). The creation of insular social networks suspicious of "outsiders" compounds the threat of violence as xenophobic attitudes drive people to

project blame for acts of violence onto others, create their own communal-defense networks (including gangs), and drive acts of extrajudicial "justice" (Moodie, 2009; Burrell, 2010; Fontes, 2018). These processes tend to be self-reinforcing; households and communities that suffer high levels of gang control and violence are often cut off from social networks that might otherwise provide some means of protection from such violence, forcing them to either acquiesce to such violence or even take part in it.

Though high levels of violence may be isolated to spaces and communities, its effects reverberate throughout society such that it becomes part of the social atmosphere and structures how people of all levels of society live their daily lives. The mass media play a complex role in relation to this violence. It can be effective in alerting citizens to government malfeasance and injustices in legal systems. However, the media also contributes to reproducing violence in ways that deeply affect civic perceptions, splashing homicides on the front page "e " *nota roja*" while graphic photos and videos circulate far and wide on social media networks (Reguillo, 2002; Barbero, 2002). While vulnerable communities experiencing high levels of violence can often resort to silence, sensationalized mass media fills the void and refracts acts of violence throughout the social system. Such a spectacle brings violence into the homes of those who have not experienced it directly, spreading fear into spaces that are otherwise protected. This can give rise to striking disconnects between levels of "material" violence (i.e., homicide rates) and citizens' perceptions of personal risk. For example, surveys from Latinobarómetro, an annual public opinion survey administered in 18 Latin American countries, including Honduras, have found that citizens of Costa Rica and Chile, countries with some of the lowest crime rates in Latin America, report experiencing more fear of violence than their counterparts in Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador (Latinobarómetro, 2019). Finally, high levels of violence and criminal impunity cycling before the public eye also expose government weakness and corruption, which in turn has also been found to increase people's sense of "hopelessness" in a better future, further driving out-migration (Olson & Olson, 2021; Restrepo et al., 2019).

Direct and Indirect Impacts of Violence on Migration

Macro-level studies of the relationship between violence and migration in Latin America and elsewhere have uncovered a strong connection between levels of violence and rates of out-migration. Shellman and Stewart (2007) found that Haitian emigration to the United States was strongly correlated with surges in political violence, even when economic conditions held constant. Studies of the impact of political violence on out-migration conducted during armed conflicts in Guatemala in the 1980s and 90s (Morrison, 1993; Morrison & May, 1994) and in Colombia in the 1990s (Morrison and Perez, 1994) found similar results.

However, given the profound effects of societal violence on economic circumstances in sending communities, there is much debate about whether the effect of violence on migration is *direct* or *indirect* through its economic and political effects. A seminal study of Salvadoran migration during armed conflict indicated that the effect of violence on migration is strongest as an indirect factor, with conflict producing local economic dislocations that, in turn, lead to emigration (Jones, 1989). In Guatemala, Morrison, and May (1994) also found that economic turmoil caused by conflict was more important than violence in predicting internal migration within Guatemala (Schultz, 1971).

More granular studies of the connection between violence and individual or household decision-making about migration also point to violence's direct and indirect influences. For example, in Engel and Ibanez's (2007) survey of displaced and non-displaced persons in Colombia in 2000, they found that the threat of violence and the presence of paramilitary and guerilla groups were strongly associated with the likelihood of out-migration. Likewise, Lundquist and Massey (2005) found that the probability of leaving Nicaragua for the United States was strongly predicted by the intensity of the American Contra Intervention.[3] However, in the context of high rates of "non-political" (i.e., criminal) violence, the influence of violence on migration is less clear. For example, in studies of the effects of rising lethal violence on household migration decisions following structural adjustment programs in Mexico and Costa Rica, Alvarado and Massey (2010) found the effects of violence were more modest and were generally associated with a lower probability of migration to the United States. Finally, in a study of violence and migration in Colombia, Silva and Massey (2015) found that while "…violence acts powerfully to determine when people migrate, the geographic distribution of social capital determines where they go. Not surprisingly, migrants go to locations where people in their social networks are currently living or have been earlier".

However, based on the above analysis, in the Honduran context there appear to be kinds of societal violence that may particularly impact Hondurans' intention to migrate. For example, extortion, which most impacts urban dwellers residing in gang-controlled territories, directly impacts its targets through violent threats and acts also has important indirect impacts on intentions to migrate through the suppression of economic life throughout a given community. The fact that gang extortion rackets are characterized by long-term pressure and coercion and that their threat does not naturally abate over time would also suggest that this type of violence will corrode Hondurans' capacity and intention to stay put.

[3] They also found that having a social tie to someone with U.S. migrant experience greatly increased the odds of leaving for the United States and that this effect was amplified during periods of heightened violence, consistent with our hypothesis of an interaction between social capital and violence.

Violence as Migration Trigger

While research on violence as a **driver** of migration has shown that violence impacts migration levels both directly and indirectly, research on violence as a **trigger** of migration is much thinner, particularly in terms of quantitative research. This is due in part to profound methodological challenges. In the context of Honduras, and many other countries with high levels of societal violence, there has historically been a lack of reliable data sources tracking acts of violence other than homicide. This is problematic because homicide levels do not necessarily capture key elements of societal violence that are linked to out-migration. For instance, the depth of territorial control exercised by organized criminal groups like gangs and narco-trafficking organizations can have an inverse relationship with murder rates. In some cases, areas with more criminal control have fewer homicides (Asmann & O' Reily, 2020). Likewise, while gender-related violence and domestic violence can sometimes end in murder, as rising levels of femicide in Honduras have demonstrated, often victims survive and must live with the constant threat of continued violence. These are but two examples highlighting how reliable and granular data on a variety of non-homicide violence is needed to understand the relationship more fully between societal violence and out-migration. In Honduras, SEPOL and CENISS track instances of extortion, rape, and domestic violence, among other reported crimes, at the municipal level. Still, such data can be unreliable because of severe underreporting of these types of crimes. Understandably, victims of gang extortion or spousal abuse, for example, are extremely fearful of reporting to Honduran police. For this and other reasons, most quantitative research on the impact of violence on migration out of Honduras, as well as Guatemala and El Salvador, draws on homicide data as a basic proxy for violence.

Clemens' (2017) study of how homicide levels impacted irregular migration of unaccompanied children (UACs) from Northern Central America provides a useful example of the possibilities and limitations of using homicide data to map out the impact of societal violence on irregular migration. Using municipal level homicide data collected from government and NGO databases, Clemens found that over a six-year period, "…a cumulative total of six additional homicides [in a given region]…caused a cumulative total of 3.7 additional unaccompanied child apprehensions in the United States." Clemens' findings fit with qualitative research and data from surveys with Central American migrants en route to the United States through Mexico which appear to show that direct experiences with violent events provoke some individuals and households to migrate (Menjivar & Walsh, 2019; Quijada & Sierra, 2019).

However, homicide rates have proven to be a flawed proxy for the types of societal violence that appear to have the largest impact on Honduran society in general and on Honduran households' capacity and intention to stay in their home communities. For example,

Honduras' national homicide rates fell consistently between 2014 and 2018 from a high in 2014 of 66 homicides per 100,000 to a low of 39 in 2018 ("Intentional homicides Honduras", 2021). Yet over the same period out-migration increased. Scholars have theorized various explanations for this apparent disconnect. Clemens claims that "Due to diffusion of migration experience and assistance through social networks, violence can cause waves of migration that increase over time, continuing to rise even when violence levels do not (Clemens, 2017, p. 1). Some research on the relationship between violence and migration in other parts of the world indicates that the experience of violence can even delay one's motivation to migrate. "As a result," Schon writes, "the people who develop intentions to migrate first may be less likely to have experienced violence personally compared to those who depart later" (Schon, 2021).

Most importantly, as subsequent sections of this report will detail, the landscape of societal violence impacting Hondurans' capacity and intention to stay in their home communities is far broader and more complex than quantitative researchers' focus on homicide rates has so far been able to capture.

YOUTH MIGRATION AS A RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE: THREE PATHWAYS

While long-term and acute exposure to societal violence tends to increase Hondurans' intentions to migrate, how they respond to violence is dictated by their capabilities in terms of their relative levels of social capital, access to key networks and resources and other factors. Based on the preceding discussions, it appears that Honduran youth who experience the threat of violence have three potential pathways they can follow based on the capacities, networks, and resources they have access to:

1. TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION

   Studies show that far more Honduran youth, particularly women, intend to migrate out of the country than those who actually make the journey. This is because transnational migration is costly, dangerous (especially for women), and often requires migrants to have access to sufficient resources and kin networks in the United States to pay for the cost of the journey and provide them with shelter. This means that those youth who can afford to migrate out of the country will likely already have enjoyed the benefits of their extended network in the United States. They must also have had the opportunity to plan and prepare for their journey by

coordinating with their social networks both in the United States and at home and must be willing to leave their Honduran familial and social networks behind.

2. INTERNAL MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT

In the face of long-term exposure to or acute experiences with violence, youth who have strong migration intentions but lack the resources and networks to act upon these intentions are likely to be forced to migrate internally, joining the growing ranks of internationally displaced persons (IDPs). Patterns of internal displacement in Honduras vary widely, but there are two distinct trajectories worth noting here:

- Rural to urban displacement driven by rural poverty, natural disaster, or climate change related catastrophe and the search for greater economic opportunities in urban areas. These IDPs tend to take up residence in poorer urban areas under the control of organized criminal actors.
- Urban-urban or urban to rural displacement is driven by violent actors' control over neighborhoods and threats or acts of violence against individuals, families or communities. These IDPs tend to move to areas where they have social or kin networks that can support them. But given the difficulties of survival for such IDPs, these initial moves may become the precursor to transnational migration if they are able to access sufficient resources to leave the country or become desperate enough to join caravans.

3. STAY IN PLACE

The final option for youth suffering from violence is to stay in place. In addition to the economic challenges that keep would-be migrants from leaving, youth who stay may do so for a variety of social network-related reasons. They may have parents, siblings, or offspring they wish to protect from the same violent actors that have targeted them. Whatever their reasons for staying, doing so may put them at an increased risk of victimization as they are targeted for violence or for recruitment into violent networks. Below we also present protective factors that might decrease the risk for further victimization in cases where youth stay in place.

3. EXTANT DATA ANALYSIS

SECTION OVERVIEW

Dozens of quantitative studies have been carried out, many in the last decade, seeking to understand the factors most responsible for irregular migration from Honduras and its neighbors. Many have focused on violence as a key factor and have sought to quantify the relative importance of violence compared to other factors as a cause or correlate of irregular migration flows.

Many of these studies have also focused on specific geographic areas, demographic populations, data types or moments in migrants' and potential migrants' physical and mental journeys. To date, this body of research resembles multiple snapshots, each piece revealing its specific subject in detail, but offering less clarity about the bigger picture.

In this chapter, we attempt to fit these disparate pieces into a more comprehensive, unified description of what drives Hondurans to migrate irregularly, what role violence plays, and how these phenomena affect young people.

This chapter is organized as follows:

- First, we propose a **hybrid conceptual model**, integrating concepts from various models presented in the previous section's literature review.
- Second, we establish a **data framework** for examining different ways in which past and future researchers have and could operationalize these concepts in quantitative studies.
- Third, we use the conceptual model to organize different studies' findings and relate them to one another and use the data framework to evaluate the reliability and applicability of each study's findings. We also present a comprehensive **synthesis of findings and outline persisting knowledge gaps** based on the body of extant quantitative studies on violence and irregular migration from Honduras.

CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Many of the studies we reviewed seek to answer the question "Why do people migrate?" But we believe too narrow of a focus on migration can obscure important insights.

Many irregular migrants have experienced poverty, violence, and other challenges. But simply noting that Hondurans who experience these threats more acutely are more likely to migrate than more fortunate Hondurans misses a large part of the story. Many Hondurans who experience poverty and violence do not migrate, but instead use other strategies to cope. What about them?

To provide actionable insights to policymakers, we believe it is more useful to ask "Which stressors—including poverty, violence, natural disasters, and corruption—most affect Hondurans' major life decisions? What key strategies do Hondurans use to cope with these factors? And what distinguishes Hondurans who cope via irregular migration from those who use other coping strategies?"

To answer these questions, we organized findings from the studies we reviewed using a hybrid conceptual model combining the Capability-Intentions Framework with the Socioeconomic Model of Human Development.

We also evaluated previous studies' findings through the lenses of two key assumptions:

- First, the relationship between Hondurans' wellbeing and migration is complex. Some Hondurans may consider migration primarily as a strategy for reacting to threats and stressors in their home country, but others may desire to migrate precisely because the educational and economic advances they've achieved in Honduras have broadened their horizons and aspirations.

- Second, the relationship between violence and migration is complex. While many studies model violence as a cause and migration as an effect, migration can itself contribute to violence in Honduras and both Hondurans who migrate and Hondurans who engage in violence are often doing so in similar contexts.

Hybrid Conceptual Model

We use the Capabilities-Intentions model because of its proven usefulness in organizing and analyzing factors related to migration. This model is also well suited to situating findings in the broader context we mentioned above. It tells us why people migrate and helps us understand how migration fits into the story of threats to human development or wellbeing

and how Hondurans respond to these threats. Adding the Socio-Ecological Model of Human Development (SEM) to the Capability-Intentions Framework helps us identify with more granularity how a given factor may relate Hondurans' decisions to migrate and consequently may provide policymakers with clearer insights on how to formulate and target interventions.

For example, viewing correlations between rates of violent crime and migration through the Capabilities-Intentions Framework may lead us to interpret violence as a phenomenon that influences Hondurans' intention to migrate. Adding in the SEM pushes us to analyze in more detail how nationwide crime rates, local crime rates, and a personal experience of violent crime may each have different effects on an individual's intention to migrate.

Figure 1: Visual representation of the hybrid conceptual model

		What does this factor influence?	
		Capability	Intentions
At what level does this factor operate?	Societal		
	Community		
	Relational		
	Individual		

Human Development and Migration

As we matched findings from our review of research to cells in the table above, we also considered how they aligned along a third dimension: human development. According to the United Nations, human development "focuses on improving the lives people lead," "is about giving people more freedom to live lives they value", and "is about providing people with opportunities" (United Nations Development Programme, 2021).

One of the complexities that became apparent was that while a lack of opportunities for human development in Honduras may drive some Hondurans' intention to migrate, it also appears to be the case that experiencing greater human development within Honduras can also increase both the capability and intentions of some Hondurans to leave their country.

Some factors that protect or promote human development are also associated with individuals' capability to remain in Honduras (for example, having closer ties to social, religious, and political organizations (factors we would place into the "community" level SEM cells in the table above). Some factors that threaten human development are associated with the intention to migrate (for example, experiencing the murder of a family member, which we would place in the "individual" or "relational" SEM cells).

But there are also factors that may simultaneously protect or promote human development and increase individuals' capability to migrate. For example, for a family living in extreme poverty, increased income will almost certainly improve life and give family members more freedom to make choices about the course of their lives. While living in extreme poverty, emigration may have seemed unthinkable to the family—they could not even afford food, much less a bus ticket out of their village. But as their income increases, immigration may become one of the new endeavors that family members can begin to realistically consider engaging in.

Throughout our synthesis of extant studies' findings, we sought to keep in mind how various factors are correlated both with migration and human development.

The Complex Interactions Between Violence and Migration: Theory

In our synthesis of extant studies' findings, we primarily discuss violence as a factor that threatens Hondurans' human development in their home country and increases their intent to emigrate. Studies reviewed in this chapter largely treat violence as one among various independent variables or inputs that are conceived of as influencing the dependent variable, or outcome, of migration.

However, conceiving of migration as only a "result" and violence only as a "cause" is an oversimplification. When parents migrate, the children they leave behind face an increased risk of being victims of violence or participating in violent behavior themselves. A UNICEF study cited in Adams (2017) notes that when parents migrate without their children:

> "Family disintegration, problems in raising children, risk behaviors among children and adolescents who are left without parental guidance and increased vulnerability to violence, abuse and exploitation are some results."

The Violence Against Youth and Violence Survey (VACS) found that Honduran children and youths whose parents emigrated or received remittances were considerably more likely to have experienced physical and sexual violence (Gobierno de Honduras, Subsecretaría de Seguridad en Prevención, Secretaría de Seguridad, 2019).

Moreover, in addition to understanding both how violence can motivate migration and how migration can contribute to conditions that increase violence, it also makes sense to consider the ways in which violence and migration may both be adverse outcomes produced by a common set of social risk factors. For example, objective poverty and a pervasive subjective sense that there are not sufficient opportunities in Honduras to "get ahead" through legal employment may motivate some individuals to seek employment opportunities in other countries, while motivating others to engage in crime as an alternative strategy to attain their economic goals.

Figure 2: Three potential relationships between violence and migration

Violence as a cause of migration	**Migration as a cause of violence**	**Violence and migration as parallel results of a common set of other negative factors**
VIOLENCE → MIGRATION	MIGRATION → VIOLENCE	VIOLENCE MIGRATION OTHER FACTORS Poverty, corruption etc.

Figure by authorsu.s.

While many of the studies we review below conceptualize violence as an input factor contributing to an outcome of migration, where applicable we comment on how findings support or contradict the idea that migration may cause violence. We also attempt to identify factors that prior research has shown to both increase risks for violence and increase risks for migration and factors that are, conversely, associated with protection against both violence and migration.

DATA FRAMEWORK

To quantify relationships between migration, violence, education, employment, and other factors, one must identify measurable indicators that can be used to operationalize these concepts. Prior quantitative studies have used a diverse array of indicators to quantify factors such as "migration" and "violence". An in-depth discussion of indicators that have

been or could be used to measure migration, violence, and other related factors in Honduras is included in section three of this report. For now, we will simply summarize the key data-related concepts we will keep in mind as we interpret and synthesize findings from previous studies.

First, we will keep in mind the following aspects of the data examined in each study:

Granularity	How "zoomed out" or "zoomed in" are the conclusions we can derive from a given indicator? For example, does a given indicator help us understand how individual people make decisions, or does it help us understand how aggregate community or national-level trends differ from one place to another or change over time?
Data Collection	Who collected the data? How was it collected? What implications might this have for the types of conclusions we can draw based on this indicator? For example, residents of a high-crime neighborhood in Tegucigalpa may respond differently to the same survey questions about violence in the neighborhood depending on whether the data collector is a stranger working for the government or a representative of a local NGO that has established a trustworthy reputation in the neighborhood. Emigrants interviewed on route or at the U.S. border may be aware of U.S. asylum laws and thus, motivated to emphasize the role of violence in their migration decisions—or conversely, they may feel especially vulnerable and unsafe, and thus less likely to feel safe talking about their experiences with criminal groups whom they believe to have far-reaching influence.
Population	From whom was the data collected and whom does the data represent? (If a survey, was the sample nationally representative or representative only of residents of a certain subregion?) In what context was it collected from this population? (For example, were migrants surveyed while boarding their first bus on the way out of San Pedro Sula, in a shelter in Mexico, in detention at the U.S. border or in their homes after having successfully settled in the United States?) What implications does this have for the extent to which conclusions may or may not be generalizable?
What is being measured?	How well does the indicator represent the factor we're interested in? (For example, homicides are often used as proxies for general crime rates, but it is possible that some communities dominated by criminal organizations have low murder rates precisely because of the extent to which the organization has come to control residents' personal interactions.

Second, we will keep in mind the following aspects of how the authors of these studies draw conclusions based on the data:

Theoretical model	Do the hypotheses tested make sense? Are important concepts left out? For example, do comparisons of migrant and non-migrant populations consider that migrants tend to be younger and thus may differ from nonimmigrants for reasons having to do with age, not migration status?
Statistical methods	Does the study provide descriptive statistics only, or does it also include statistical tests? If the latter, what implications do the methods used have for how results are interpreted? For example, if a study reports descriptive statistics showing rates of both crime victimization and migration are higher among one population than another, when drawing conclusions, we must keep in mind that a) we do not know if this difference between populations is statistically significant and b) these results do not shed light on whether violence causes migration, migration causes violence, or both are caused by something else.
Results	What do the results themselves say? How strong or weak is the evidence this provides for a given conclusion? How widely or narrowly can these conclusions be generalized to other populations? For example, a public opinion survey based on a nationally representative sample can tell us about overall national trends but if we try to use this study to understand dynamics in a particular community targeted for an intervention, we need to understand that local community dynamics may be very different.

SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS FROM 35 QUANTITATIVE STUDIES

Overview

We reviewed 35 quantitative studies whose authors sought to understand violence, internal displacement, or international migration in Honduras specifically or in a group of countries including Honduras. Two-thirds of the studies were published between 2019 and 2021, while the remaining third were published between 2011 and 2019. Many of the studies are based on surveys that ask individuals in Honduras about their intent to migrate or ask migrants in

Mexico or the United States about their experiences prior to leaving Honduras. Other studies compare municipal statistics to municipal rates of migration, calculated via data on border apprehensions collected by U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Others use other methodologies.

We have grouped our observations based on these studies into three thematic areas:

1. Violence, economic challenges, and migration
2. Family, community resources, interactions with government and migration
3. The complex interactions between violence and migration: data

For each thematic area, we first summarize findings from the studies we consider to be most rigorous based on the guidelines described in the data framework section above. We then review additional studies, considering how they might support, explain or add additional dimensions to the most rigorous studies' findings. Throughout, we situate these studies' findings within the hybrid conceptual model described earlier in section 3.

Migration Versus Intent to Migrate

Many of the studies we reviewed seek to understand the drivers of irregular migration by comparing the experiences and opinions of two groups of Hondurans: Hondurans who either have migrated or those who reside in Honduras but intend to migrate in the future and Hondurans who either simply live in Honduras, or who live in Honduras and do not intend to migrate.

Because we sought to synthesize the findings of both studies that examined Hondurans who migrated and studies examining individuals who still lived in Honduras but intended to migrate in the future, it is worth briefly discussing the relative merits of these two approaches.

Using "intent" to migrate to understand the opinions and characteristics of Hondurans who do migrate is advantageous in several ways. First, for researchers based in Honduras, it is easier to survey individuals who are still in Honduras than to track down Hondurans who are in transit or have arrived in the United States. Second, interventions by development cooperation agencies, NGOs and the Honduran government target individuals who still live in Honduras, so it may make sense to survey the population of potential intervention beneficiaries instead of surveying individuals who are no longer in Honduras and thus will not benefit from interventions in Honduras.

On the other hand, the major drawback is that those who plan to emigrate may not actually do so, and those who say they plan to stay in Honduras may emigrate. So just how reliable is self-reported intent to migrate as a proxy for actual migration?

Researchers have found significant correlations between intention to migrate and actual migration.

For example, a study by Tfjaden et al. (2018) used nationally representative public opinion surveys from more than 160 countries, data on migrant inflows from the OECD and other European countries, and migrant outflow data from the UN to analyze correlations between intent to migrate and actual migration. The researchers found that countries in which a relatively higher percentage of survey respondents said they intended to emigrate tended to have higher actual migrant outflows than countries where fewer residents desired to leave (Tjaden, Auer, & Laczko, 2018). (The researchers also identified the countries that survey respondents most often identified as their desired destination for emigration and found that on average these countries had higher rates of actual inbound migration compared to countries to which people rarely desired to migrate.

In another study, Creighton (2013) examined the migration aspirations and subsequent migration actions of individuals in Mexico, using data from a longitudinal survey that was conducted in two parts at different times. The survey included responses from nearly 13,000 individuals from 80 municipalities in Mexico, carried out by the Mexican government. Responses for the first part of the survey were collected in 2002. Respondents were asked about their aspirations to migrate to another municipality, another state, or the United States. Responses for the second part of the survey were collected in 2005. "Household members that left the household were located and re-interviewed both within Mexico and […] the United States"; 90% of first-part respondents were interviewed again in the second part. After controlling for sociodemographic factors, household migration ties, household migration history, neighborhood crime, and urbanicity, Creighton found that compared with those who reported no migration aspiration, individuals who reported aspiring to migrate to another municipality, state, or to the U.S. were significantly more likely to migrate to these destinations (Creighton, 2013).

While neither of the studies cited above focused specifically on Honduras, they provide some indication studies examining intent to migrate among people residing in Honduras can be assumed to provide a reasonable proxy for understanding Hondurans who migrate.

Violence, Economic Challenges and Intent to Migrate

Sixteen of the studies reviewed attempt to gauge the relative importance of violence vis-à-vis economic challenges such as poverty and unemployment in motivating Hondurans to migrate.

These studies consistently identify economics and violence as the two most important factors contributing to Hondurans' intent to migrate. Some studies suggest that economics may be a more important contributor to migration from rural areas, while violence may play a more important role in-migration from urban areas. The studies we reviewed also suggest that Hondurans' decisions to migrate are often triggered by a change in their economic situation, by the experience of a violent act, or the reception of a direct and explicit threat of future violence.

Hondurans' Intent to Migrate was most Influenced by Economics and Violence

The 2017 study by Clemens *Violence, Development, and Migration Waves: Evidence from Central American Child Migrant Apprehensions* and a series of 2020 analyses carried out by Danielson are among the most rigorous studies we reviewed. Both use individual-level Customs and Border Protection (CBP) border apprehension records to estimate annual rates of emigration for each of Honduras' 298 municipalities, then calculate the extent to which various other municipal conditions such as poverty rates, homicide rates, and changes in these rates explain the differences between municipal emigration rates.

Danielson's 2020 study, *Decomposition Analysis of Violence Compared to Economic and Migrant Network Effects*, used individual-level data from all CBP apprehensions of Hondurans at the U.S. southern border between 2013 and 2019 to calculate municipal migration rates for each of these years. He then used a multivariate model to estimate the correlations between municipal migration rates and violence (measured via homicide rates and change in homicide rates), municipal population size, department-level economic statistics (measured via unemployment, per-capita income, and average annual changes in these statistics), drought, and migration networks. He found that municipalities with higher rates of violence, drought, and economic adversity on average have higher rates of migration. In Danielson's model, economic factors explained 11.6% of the variance in municipal migration rates between 2013 and 2019, while violence explained 10.7% (Danielson M., 2020).

Table 1: Explanatory Power of Factors Correlated with Emigration Rates from Honduras (Danielson, 2020)

Factor	Percentage of differences between municipal emigration rates explained by this factor, 2013-19
Population	2.7%
Economy	11.6%
Drought	3.5%
Violence	10.7%
Migration Networks	28.9%
Unexplained	42.6%
Total R^2	0.574

Source: Danielson (2020)

Clemens' 2017 study *Violence Development, and Migration Waves* pioneered the methodology used by Danielson. Clemens' study differed from Danielson's in that it covered an earlier time period (2011-2016), only included CBP apprehension data on unaccompanied minors (UACs) instead of all migrants, and included data from all three countries in the North of Central America instead of just Honduras. Many of the key results, however, were similar.

Like Danielson, Clemens found a significant relationship between municipal crime rates (measured using homicides as a proxy) and municipal migration rates. "The analysis finds that a sustained increase of one homicide per year in the Northern Triangle over all six years 2011–2016 caused about 0.9 additional UAC apprehensions in the United States in any given year between 2011 and 2016, or about 3.7 additional UAC apprehensions as a cumulative total over all the years" (Clemens M.A., 2017).

Like Danielson, Clemens also found that the violence and economic conditions explained roughly similar amounts of the variation in municipal migration rates: "Violence and the interaction of violence with economic conditions together explain roughly as much of UAC rates at the municipal level as do economic conditions by themselves" (Clemens M.A., 2017).

Clemens also found that the relationship between violence and municipal migration rates was not linear; instead, migration rates were predicted to accelerate once a certain

threshold of violence levels was passed. According to Clemens:

> "There is notable nonlinearity in the relationship: the slope markedly rises at higher (conditional) homicide rates. The figures suggest that above a homicide rate of 100, the marginal relationship between homicide and UAC rates is roughly 3–4 times below a homicide rate of 100. In other words, where the linear relationship suggests that a three-year sustained increase in the homicide rate of 1 causes ~0.9 additional UAC arrivals, the local coefficient may be closer to ~0.5 for municipalities below a homicide rate of 100 and closer to ~1.5–2.0 for municipalities above a homicide rate of 100."

Given that CBP apprehensions do not capture the full magnitude of migration flows, many migrants successfully evade apprehension and make it into the United States without being recorded, and many others are detained and deported by Mexican authorities before ever reaching the U.S. border, it is likely that the effect sizes cited in these studies underestimate the true number of additional immigrants likely to result from increases in violence or economic hardship.

The types of data sources these studies are based on, such as CBP-reported migrant apprehensions and rates of murder and poverty tracked by the Honduran government, mean these studies avoid some of the uncertainties that affect the interpretation of survey-based studies relying on self-reported data. On the other hand, this same design means that the results can only help us understand differences in rates of migration between municipalities; they do not shed light on why some individuals within a given municipality migrate, while others experiencing the same municipal-level conditions do not.

A series of studies based on survey data, conversely, help us understand in more detail how violence and economic conditions contribute to individuals' intent to migrate. While these surveys are representative at the national level or representative of specific subnational regions, they do not address potential differences between individual decision-making dynamics in different parts of Honduras.

Studies based on the *AmericasBarometer* and *Latinobarómetro surveys* provide a methodologically sound basis for understanding correlations between Hondurans' intentions to migrate and other personal opinions and experiences.

For example, a multivariate analysis of 2018/19, AmericasBarometer survey data from Honduras, found that having a family member who had been extorted, experiencing food insecurity, and experiencing economic insecurity all had similarly sized effects on the probability of expressing intent to migrate. Being a victim of corruption, receiving remittances, and having family or friends in the United States also increased the probability of respondents expressing intent to migrate (Hiskey & Córdova, 2019).

Graham and Markowitz' analysis of Latinobarómetro data from 2004 and 2006-2009 found that survey respondents who were younger (18-29), who said they or a family member had been a victim of crime in the last year, who had higher objective wealth but whose income was lower relative to their expectations for themselves were more likely to express intent to migrate (Graham & Markowitz, 2011). Several survey-based studies focusing only on regional or demographic subsets of the Honduran population also concluded that, for the populations studied, violence and economics were key correlates of intent to migrate.

The results of a survey of 3,430 middle-class families in nine primarily urban municipalities in Honduras found that the "principal causes of migration are associated with economic factors, violence, security, and corruption in the country" (USAID, 2020).

A 2020 report by Creative Associates used total remittances received per municipality to estimate which municipalities in countries from the North of Central America contributed the most migrants to the United States. They surveyed 2,400 individuals in the top 60 municipalities (12 of them in Honduras), asking respondents about their intent to migrate. The study found that 33% of Honduran respondents intended to migrate; of these, about one in five cited being victims of violence as the primary motive for wanting to migrate (Creative Associates International, 2020).

Pavón reviewed all 437 intake files for Honduran women who were deported from March to June 2016 and processed at the Centro de Atencion al Migrante (CAMI) in San Pedro Sula. While in general deportees tend to be older than the average migrant, this specific sample aligned closely with the profile of individuals who were leaving the country at the time: 62% were between 18-30 years old, and 74% had left Honduras earlier the same year. Pavón found that 74% had left Honduras for economic reasons, 12% for reasons related to community or domestic violence, and 10% for family reunification (Pavon Rodriguez L. U., 2017).

In contrast to Danielson's and Clemens' findings, Creative's and Pavon's studies both concluded that economic conditions explained a greater proportion of intent to migrate than violence. However, given the narrower populations studied by the latter two and the fact that their outcome variable is intent to migrate rather than actual migration, we find more convincing the conclusions reached independently by Danielson and Clemens, which coincide with other studies in identifying economic factors as one of the most important contributors to migration, but suggest violence is a close second.

We also reviewed two surveys of individuals who had migrated to the United States. Because of the limited populations these surveys relied on, it is questionable how generalizable their findings are. Nonetheless, we present some relevant conclusions below.

A survey of migrants from the North of Central America who had successfully settled in the U.S. also found that both violence and economics were important factors motivating migration. Abuelafia et al. (2019) surveyed 1,859 migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras who lived in Los Angeles, New York and Washington, D.C. Among respondents from Honduras, 75% listed economic reasons as one of their top two reasons for leaving Honduras, 43% cited violence and 31% mentioned family reunification. (Abuelafia, Del Carmen, & Ruiz-Arranz, 2019)

In 2012 the Women's Refugee Commission (WRC) carried out a series of interviews and focus groups with 151 unaccompanied minors (UACs) from the North of Central America who were being held at emergency overflow facilities after being apprehended by US Customs and Border Protection. 77% of those interviewed said that violence was the main reason more children were leaving the region (Women's Refugee Commission, 2012).

Finally, it is worth noting that several public opinion surveys found that violence and economics are high on the list of concerns for Hondurans in general, regardless of migration intent.

In three applications (2014, 2016, 2018) of a survey administered to a nationally representative sample of 3,000 households in Honduras, respondents' opinions shifted regarding the most urgent problem facing the country. First, the proportion of respondents rating insecurity as the country's most urgent problem steadily decreased from 70.5% to 42.8%. On the other hand, the proportion of respondents citing economic hardships increased, from 22.1% to 38.2%. The proportion of respondents citing corruption also increased, from 5.8% to 17.1%. The results were consistent across age, sex, and education (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, 2018).

In the 2020 edition of *Equipo de Reflexión, Investigación y Comunicación's* (ERIC) annual nationally representative poll assessing Hondurans' feelings about the state of their country, one question asked about Honduras' principal problem. 51.7% of respondents cited problems related to the economy, 23.5% cited security and violence, and 13% cited corruption and impunity. Responses to a question about what respondents' dreams for their country ten years from now followed a similar pattern: the top three responses were "everyone working" 29%, "no violence" 23%, and "no corruption" 12%. When asked why they believed their compatriots emigrated, 79.1% cited employment and economic hardship, followed by 14.4% citing violence and insecurity (Equipo de Reflexión, Investigación y Comunicación).

Personal Experiences of Violence and Threats Trigger Migration

Numerous studies indicate that personal experiences of violence or direct threats of future violence affect Hondurans' intention to migrate more than simply living in communities with high crime rates.

For example, Creative (2020) found that nearly one-third of survey respondents who considered migrating from Honduras had a family member or close friend who was murdered, twice the rate of those who do not intend to migrate (15%). The Creative survey also found that 61% of Honduran respondents who had considered migrating had been robbed on the street, compared to 39% of those who had not considered migrating (Creative Associates International, 2020).

Women from Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador who responded to the AmericasBarometer survey and both had been the victims of a crime in the past year and intended to migrate were far more likely to report also having endured a wide variety of other negative experiences, compared with women who had not experienced a crime or did not intend to migrate. These experiences included:

- Having household members who had also been victims of violence in the last year
- Reporting the presence of gangs, extortion, and homicides
- Personally experiencing corrupt behavior from police, public health workers, school officials, other public employees, and/or officials at their place of work
- Experiencing perceived danger in a variety of settings, including school and sites for recreation, and experiencing the fear of being murdered
- Perceiving their neighborhoods as unsafe and believing that most politicians are corrupt (Hiskey, Cordova, Malone, & Orces, 2021).

A 2019 Honduran government survey of 837 households distributed throughout all of Honduras' departments except Islas de la Bahia and Gracias a Dios found that 20% of households in which a member had been a direct victim of crime in the last year were making plans to move (whether within Honduras or outside), compared to just 4% of households who had not experienced a crime in the last year (Comisión Interinstitucional para la Protección de las Personas Desplazadas Internamente por la Violencia (CIPPDV), 2019).

As of 2016, nearly 41% of Hondurans reported intent to migrate. Of these, nearly one in three had been a victim of crime (including robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, and extortion) compared to fewer than one in four among the overall population. Among the

22% of Hondurans who had experienced a crime in the previous year, nearly three in five intended to migrate (Hiskey J., Decision Points: Crime and Corruption as Drivers of Emigration in Honduras, 2018).

Leaving the Devil You Know: Crime Victimization, US Deterrence Policy, and the Emigration Decision in Central America by Hiskey, Cordova et al (2018), presents an analysis of AmericasBarometer data from 2014. They found that Hondurans of all genders who reported being victims of crime one or more times in the past year were more likely to intend to migrate. Hondurans who were victimized multiple times in the previous year were most likely to report an intention to migrate: "Being victimized by crime multiple times within a single year clearly emerges as decisive in pushing respondents to consider emigration as a viable life option" (Hiskey, Malone, & Orces, 2018).

Using AmericasBarometer survey data from 2014 to 2019, a recent study compared four groups of women from the countries in the North of Central America:

> Those who had **not** been victims of a crime in the past year and who **did not** intend to migrate
> Those who had **not** been victims of a crime in the past year and **did** intend to migrate
> Those who **had** been victims of crime but **did not** intend to migrate
> Those who **had** been victims of crime and **did** intend to migrate.

The researchers found that 40% of women who experienced a crime in the last year intended to migrate, and that among all women who intended to migrate, 28% had experienced a crime in the last year (Hiskey, Cordova, Malone, & Orces, 2021).

A 2015 study of migrants from Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, surveyed while they were passing through Mexico, suggests that violence is indeed an important factor affecting the intentions of actual migrants. Medecins sans Frontieres surveyed a random sample of 467 migrants in four *albergues* (shelters) along the migrant route through Mexico. 67.6% of respondents were Honduran and half of the survey respondents cited violence as a factor in their reason for migrating (27% cited only reasons related to violence while another 23% cited both violence and other factors). The survey is not representative of the total Honduran migrant population: 88% of respondents were male and the survey was only applied to migrants who were seeking services in *albergues* and who consequently were more likely to be traveling on their own or in caravans as opposed to with coyotes. Nevertheless, the survey does indicate that at the time the data were collected, a nontrivial proportion of Honduran migrants were motivated by violence (Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2017).

In addition, when asked simply about their experience with violence in their home countries (irrespective of this experience's perceived influence on the decision to migrate), one-third of all survey respondents had experienced physical violence perpetrated by a non-family member in the previous two years, half had received a direct threat, and 78% of those who were threatened said the threat seriously affected their social and professional activities. 45.4% of Hondurans surveyed experienced the murder of a family member in the previous two years, 57% said they never felt safe at home, 72% regularly heard gunshots in their neighborhoods, and 75% had witnessed a murder or a corpse in the previous two years (Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2017).

MSF clinical case notes from mental health consultations with 1,817 migrants in 2015 and 2016 also highlight the role of violence. 47% of the patients attended to by MSF staff reported being forced to flee their homes. An overwhelming majority, 92.2%, had experienced a violent event in their country of origin or *en route*. This data is clearly not representative of the overall Honduran migrant population; one would expect experiences of violence to be overrepresented among migrants voluntarily seeking out aid for mental health issues and the MSF sample included patients from a variety of nationalities in addition to Honduras. Nonetheless, the MSF case notes, like the MSF survey, indicate that at the time these data were collected a nontrivial number of Honduran migrants were motivated to leave their country at least in part by violence (Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2017).

Both an MSF survey of migrants passing through Mexico and MSF case notes for mental health consultations with in-transit migrants highlight the importance of threats as a specific type of violence motivating migration. Among Honduran survey respondents who cited violence as a motivation for emigrating, about 29% said they or their family members had been directly threatened. This was the most frequently cited form of violence that Honduran respondents said motivated them to migrate. In addition, 17% said they or their families had been directly attacked, about 7% said gangs had tried to forcibly recruit them, and 3% said they had been extorted. Among mental health patients from all countries of origin, 44% reported being threatened either in their home country or on route[4] (Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2017).

Like the MSF study, Keller, et al. (2017) is not representative of the overall Honduran migrant population. The study is based on a relatively small sample (74 Hondurans), women were overrepresented (85%), and all participants were pursuing asylum claims and therefore more likely than the average Honduran migrant to be motivated by fear of harm or persecution rather than economic hardship. Nonetheless, the study does provide interesting insights into the specific manifestations of violence that motivate migration. Among the Hondurans included in the study, nearly half reported threats of violence against them, 40% were recipients of death threats, 13% faced threats of sexual violence, and 27% were victims

[4] This info may be affected by migrants' knowledge that asylum in the US is connected to being able to demonstrate being in an at-risk group if returned.

of extortion. Far fewer had personally experienced physical or sexual violence, but 49% had family members who had experienced physical violence and 37% had a family member who had been murdered.

Alas & Hernandez's 2020 study, *Migración y trabajo: el imaginario colectivo sobre el empleo: estudio con menores que cursan el Tercer Ciclo de Educación Basica en Olancho e Intibuca*, through surveys on youths from Olancho and Intibucá found no significant difference in migration intentions between students who had been victims of violence on the way to or from school and those who had not. However, the group surveyed here was also very small. Most students in this study had not been victims and felt safe in their communities. On the other hand, a small but statistically significant difference was found related to bullying: compared with students who never talked about emigrating, students who did talk about emigrating were 5 percentage points more likely to have been hit or had their possessions stolen, hidden, or broken by classmates (Alas Solis & Hernandez, 2019).

A 2019 study undertaken by the Honduran government, with support from UNHCR, surveyed 836 internally displaced (IDP) households and 837 comparison households distributed among all of Honduras' departments except the Bay Islands and Gracias a Dios. IDPs are those that are displaced "because of generalized violence and organized criminal gangs" (Consejo de Derechos Humanos - Naciones Unidas, 2016). 55% of the IDPs surveyed moved somewhere else within the same municipality, while the rest moved to other municipalities either in the same or another territorial department. The IDPs' descriptions of the specific ways in which violence motivated them to move echo findings in other studies focusing on international emigrants. Direct threats were the most frequent trigger of internal displacement (55% of households), followed by homicide (40%) and restrictions on movement (24%). 48% of the violent acts or threats triggering internal displacement were perpetrated by street gangs, 26% by family members, friends, or acquaintances; and 4% by organized crime (Comisión Interinstitucional para la Protección de las Personas Desplazadas Internamente por la Violencia (CIPPDV), 2019).

A 2019 report by CONADEH summarized the reasons 701 families had filed reports with the agency because they had been internally displaced or were at risk of being internally displaced. The most frequent reason, threats, was reported by 55.5% of families. Murder or disappearance was a cause in 12.8% of cases reported, extortion in 12.5%, kidnapping or assault in 12.9%, and forced recruitment in 4.1% of the cases (CONADEH, 2019).

In another document, Comisión Interinstitucional para la Protección de Personas Desplazadas por la Violencia reports on 639 individuals from Tegucigalpa displaced by violence in 2019. Among the seven "sending" neighborhoods with the highest case numbers, accounting for 39 cases, the top reason was threats, cited in 20 cases. In addition, ten experienced murders of a family member or an attack on themselves, seven experienced

forced eviction, and six were victims of extortion. (Comisión Interinstitucional para la Protección de Personas Desplazadas por la Violencia, 2015).

Threats were the most frequently cited reason for displacement cited among internally displaced individuals attended to by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) office in Honduras between 2017 and 2020 (Consejo Noruego para Refugiados, 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020).

The Compounding Effect of Corruption

MESCLA analyzed two surveys that asked questions about migration intent and other opinions and experiences. The first survey, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), took a random, representative sample of eight regions across Honduras. A total of 1,560 individuals of voting age were surveyed. This sample was stratified by region, rural or urban area, and size of the municipality. The other survey was administered by FHI 360, a human development organization. They collected responses from 3,460 individuals, representative of the middle-class population over the age of 18 in nine municipalities. MESCLA's analysis found that in both datasets, individuals who had experienced government corruption, for example, by being asked to pay a bribe, were nearly as likely to consider migrating as those who had been victims of violent crime. Moreover, MESCLA found that individuals who experienced both violence and corruption were more likely than victims of just one of these situations to consider emigrating and that individuals in all three groups were more likely to intend to migrate than non-victims. In both surveys, individuals who had been victimized by both crime and corruption and who were also dissatisfied with democracy were the most likely to report an intention to migrate (USAID-MESCLA, 2020).

Figure 3: Migration intentions by crime and corruption victimization. Data collected through two surveys.

	INTENTIONS TO MIGRATE			
	FHI 360		LA POP	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Victim of Corruption and Crime	57%	47%	67%	58%
Victim of Corruption	38%	29%	59%	49%
Crime Victim	42%	32%	59%	49%
Non-victim	25%	18%	50%	40%

SOURCE: Logistic regression model estimates, with all other variables held constant.

Reproduced from (USAID, 2020).

It seems likely that crime victims see emigration as a viable strategy in part because they do not see reporting crimes to the police as a viable strategy. A survey by the *Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras* (2018) shows that in 2018 only 22.4% of victims of crime reported it to the authorities. Furthermore, of those who reported a crime to the police, only 15% had a positive outcome; 77.9% said that either nothing had happened, or the police did some work but never caught the criminal, and 7.3% said the police caught the criminal but let them go again. Of those who did not report the crime to the police, most (64.8%) said they believed reporting the crime would have been pointless because authorities do not solve anything (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, 2018). Others decided not to report crimes against them because they felt doing so would put them in danger or because they did not have corroborating evidence, or because they did not feel the crime was serious.

Among all respondents, 44.0% rated "public order forces" as "absent" and only 25.8% rated them as highly effective. Similarly, 65.8% of respondents rated political institutions as "absent" and 15.3% as highly effective (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, 2018).

Changes in Personal Economic Situations Trigger Migration

Several studies suggest that changes in Hondurans' real or perceived economic situation tend to increase intent to migrate and real migration rates.

Danielson´s 2020 study, *Decomposition Analysis of Violence Compared to Economic and Migrant Network Effects,* found that the average departmental unemployment rate across all the years he studied "had no relationship to migration flow". On the other hand, "average change in the unemployment rate was positively associated with migration flow across all three models".

Creative's *Saliendo Adelante* found, for example, that "believing that their household's economic situation is on the decline is an interestingly strong indicator of migration. This is particularly true in high-migration municipalities in Honduras, where believing that the household is worse off than it was the previous year makes individuals 1.5 times more likely to consider migrating" (Creative Associates International, 2020).

Additionally, USAID's MESCLA activity estimated the relationship between Honduran emigration rates and coffee prices and found once prices dipped below $1.50/lb, migration rates increased rapidly (USAID-MESCLA, 2019) suggesting that a marked decrease in certain Hondurans' income may have been related to more of these individuals choosing to migrate.

Different Dynamics in Urban and Rural Areas

Several studies suggest that violence may contribute more heavily to emigration from urban areas of Honduras, while economic factors may be a more important influence on emigration from rural areas.

Both Clemens (2017) and Danielson (Decomposition Analysis, 2020) carried out "spatial decomposition" analyses in which they analyzed the relative extent to which violence, economic hardship, and migration networks contributed to migration in each of Honduras' 298 municipalities. One potentially useful takeaway from Danielson's map (Figure 4) is that the drivers of migration in rural areas tend to be weighted more towards economic hardship, and in urban areas, more towards violence.

Figure 4: Determinants of migration by municipality



Reproduced from USAID, 2021

Several other studies support this interpretation.

Honduran, El Salvadorean, and Guatemalan female AmericasBarometer respondents who had been victims of crime and intended to migrate were more likely to be from urban areas than women who intended to migrate but who had not personally experienced a crime in the last year (Hiskey, Cordova, Malone, & Orces, 2021). An intuitive paraphrasing of this finding is that "violent crime rates are higher in urban areas, so urban potential migrants are more likely to be motivated by experiences of violence than their rural counterparts."

Four survey-based studies focused on youths from primarily rural communities in Honduras found economics to be a considerably more important factor than violence in influencing respondents' intent to migrate. While each of these studies focused on very specific populations both in terms of geography and age, the similarity of their findings is worth noting.

Williams & Vaughan´s *Honduras Rural Livelihoods, Migration, and Violence Study* surveyed 4,358 students at public middle and high schools in five rural municipalities in Western Honduras, as well as 676 households from four of the municipalities.

The study results show that 24% of the household study participants and more than 64% of students 16 years of age and older state an intention to migrate out of Honduras in the next year. Whether an actual intention or merely a desire to migrate, these high numbers signal a high level of distress in the population. Six variables predict an individual's intention to migrate: perception of the availability of on-farm and illicit livelihoods, perception of community support of youth, food security, land ownership, and if a family member has migrated within the past year.

Economic stress, lack of jobs and poverty were the most common themes across all qualitative measures in response to questions posed on changes in agriculture, perception of rural livelihoods, the value of educational attainment, drivers of migration, drivers of violence, and more (Williams & Castellanos, 2020).

A survey of 2,106 8th and 9th-grade students from both urban and rural communities in the departments of Olancho and Intibucá found that students who talked about emigrating (slightly less than half of the sample) on average had lower socioeconomic status, had parents with lower educational levels, and were more likely to be from rural areas (Alas Solis & Hernandez, 2019).

A 2019 OMIH survey of 760 young people (ages 18-30) in nine rural municipalities in the departments of Choluteca and Valle found that one in three planned to emigrate within the next three years. Of those who intended to migrate, 80% cited employment and economic issues as their primary motivation and just 2% cited violence. About 15% of survey respondents had already emigrated one or more times and were back in Honduras at the time of the survey due to deportation or voluntary return. Of these, 89% said they had left Honduras for the first time due to economic and employment reasons (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras - Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), 2019).

In 2016, the Observatorio de la Migracion Internacional en Honduras (OMIH) surveyed 624 youths (ages 18-30) from nine rural municipalities in Comayagua and La Paz; 48% had never migrated, while the rest had emigrated one or more times, including several who had been deported within the previous year. Among those who had migrated previously, nearly

two-thirds cited economic opportunity as their principal motivation (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras - Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), 2016).

One important caveat to note is that three of the studies cited above, *Honduras Rural Livelihoods, Migration, and Violence Study (2020)* ; *Migración y trabajo: el imaginario colectivo sobre el empleo: estudio con menores que cursan el Tercer Ciclo de Educación Básica en Olancho e Intibucá (2020); y Encuesta sobre juventud, empleo y migración (2016 y 2019-)* distributed surveys in schools thereby not including youths who are not in school. Other studies suggest that youths not in school are more likely to be affected by violence (USAID - Asegurando la Educación, 2020). By leaving such students out of the sample, these studies may underestimate the relationship between violence and migration among the overall youth population in the communities of interest.

Violence, Economic Challenges and Intent to Migrate: Conclusions

Several key points emerge from the review above.

First, violence and economic factors are both important contributors to Hondurans' intent to migrate. Danielson's 2020 Decomposition Analysis was one of the most rigorous studies we reviewed. It found that economic factors including unemployment and per-capita income explained 11.6% of the variance in municipal migration rates, while violence, measured using the homicide rate, explained 10.7%. Hiskey & Córdova's 2019 multivariate analysis of 2018/19 America's Barometer survey data from Honduras was among the most rigorous and nationally representative survey-based studies we reviewed. This study found that having a family member who had been extorted, experiencing food insecurity, or experiencing economic insecurity all had similarly sized effects on the probability of expressing intent to migrate.

Second, being personally robbed, extorted, raped, or threatened, having a close relative experience one of these crimes, or having a relative that was murdered increases Hondurans' intent to migrate. Danielson's and Clemens' work demonstrates that municipalities that experience higher murder rates also experience higher emigration rates. Data from multiple surveys suggests that individuals who directly experience crime are most likely to emigrate. Studies including Hiskey, Cordova, Malone, & Orces (2021), Creative (2020), Hiskey & Córdova (2019), and *Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras - Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales* (FLACSO) (2019) have found that people currently residing in Honduras are more likely to intend to migrate if they have personally experienced a violent crime. And studies based on surveys of Hondurans who already have migrated (Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2017) and Hondurans who have been internally displaced (*Comisión Interinstitucional para la Protección de Personas Desplazadas por la Violencia*, 2019; CONADEH, 2019) found that many have indeed experienced violence and/or threats of violence and cite this experience as a primary cause for leaving home.

Third, a lack of confidence in the government's ability to protect crime victims compounds the effects of crime victimization on intent to migrate. Relatively few Hondurans believe law enforcement is effective or even bother reporting crimes committed against them to the police (*Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras*, 2018). Hondurans who have been victimized by crime have also had a negative experience with corrupt government officials (such as being asked for a bribe). Those who are dissatisfied with how democracy works in Honduras are between 1.7 and 3 times as likely to intend to migrate compared with non-victims who are satisfied with democracy (USAID-MESCLA, 2020).

Together, the three points above suggest that the reason higher-crime municipalities have higher migration rates is not that these municipalities' residents feel more afraid, but rather that these municipalities have more residents who have personally been attacked or threatened and that these victims do not trust the Honduran government to keep them safe but rather feel they must flee their communities in order to stay safe.

Fourth, several studies suggest that changes in economic conditions and perceptions of those conditions have a greater effect on Hondurans' intentions to migrate than long-term economic conditions.

For example, findings from Danielson (Decomposition Analysis, 2020) suggest that regions with higher unemployment would not necessarily be expected to have higher emigration rates, but regions where the unemployment rate has recently increased are likely to have higher emigration rates than regions where unemployment rates have remained stable. Creative Associates (2020) found that individuals who believed their household economic situation had gotten worse in the last year were more likely to intend to migrate than individuals who believed they were the same or better off than the previous year.

And fifth, various studies suggest that the relative importance of economic considerations and violence in influencing intent to migrate vary based on local conditions. Hondurans living in areas with higher crime rates, often urban areas, are more likely to experience crime as a primary factor influencing intent to migrate. Individuals living in rural areas, which tend to have lower crime rates, are more likely to experience economic factors as the most important contributors to their intent to migrate. (Danielson, 2020; Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras - Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), 2019; Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras - Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), 2016; etc.)

Family, Community Resources and Capability to Migrate

In addition to examining how violence and economic factors are correlated with migration, many of the studies we reviewed also explored the effects of ties to family and/or friends

who have already migrated, the effects of income and education, and the effects of feeling a sense of belonging in one's home community.

Family Ties and Capability to Migrate

Due to decades of immigration and the establishment of significant diaspora populations, many Hondurans today have ties to compatriots living abroad. AmericasBarometer survey data shows that as of 2018, 71.4% of Hondurans "said that they had at least one close friend or family member living in the United States", and of these, about half talked with them at least once a month. In other words, roughly one-third of Honduran adults talk every month with a friend or family member in the United States. In addition, 21.5% of Hondurans receive remittances (Hiskey J., An Analysis of Emigration Intentions among Hondurans, 2019).

Studies consistently find that these Hondurans with more connections to compatriots living abroad are more likely to migrate themselves. For example, Danielson (2020) found that variance in the strength of migrant networks (measured in part based on the percentage of households with a member living abroad prior to the period of study) accounted for the greatest proportion of variation in migration rates between municipalities, explaining nearly 30% of this variation, compared with violence and economic indicators, which each explained 11% to 12% of the variation in municipal migration rates (Danielson, 2020). Hiskey J. T., Cordova, Malone, & Orces (2018) also found that Honduran respondents to the AmericasBarometer survey were more likely to report an intention to migrate if they received remittances from abroad.

But why exactly are Hondurans with connections to individuals who have already migrated more likely to migrate themselves? Do interactions with migrants simply increase their awareness of and interest in migration? Are they motivated to reunite with these friends and family members? Or do these contacts with previous migrants primarily serve as resources that increase Hondurans' capability to migrate?

The answer is likely all of the above. However, in a nationally representative survey, *Equipo de Reflexión, Investigación y Comunicación* (ERIC) in 2020 found that fewer than one in two hundred respondents believed family reunification was the primary reason their compatriots emigrated. Several other studies suggest that increased capability may be the most important way in which migrant networks contribute to further migration.

For example, among migrants from the North of Central America who had settled in the United States and were surveyed by Abuelafia, Del Carmen, & Ruiz-Arranz (2019), 94% said they arrived in the United States at the home of a specific person they already knew. When asked about their top two motivations for migrating, though, only 31% of Honduran respondents mentioned family reunification.

A 2016 survey of over 300 rural youths from Comayagua and La Paz who had emigrated and later returned to Honduras found that a sizable minority relied on migration networks to make their journey possible. 43% traveled with neighbors, friends, or family members and 36% had the cost of their journey covered by family members in the destination country. Nevertheless, only 6% said they were motivated to make their journey by family reunification (*Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras - Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales* (FLACSO), 2016).

Similarly, a 2019 survey of rural youths from Choluteca and Valle found that among youths who had previously emigrated and were back in Honduras at the time the survey was administered, 31% received advice about their journey from family members living in destination countries, and 32% received advice from coyotes, many of whom the migrants presumably got in contact with through family or community ties. However, among youths in the same survey who had not migrated but stated an intention to do so, fewer than 9% said they were motivated by family reunification (*Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras - Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales* (FLACSO), 2019).

Alas and Hernandez's (2020) survey of youths in Olancho and Intibucá found that youths who talk frequently about migrating are more likely to have relationships with relatives living abroad (70.2%) than youths who do not talk about emigrating (52.6%). A higher percentage of youths who talk about immigrating also receive remittances. However, it is notable that over half of youths in this study who do not talk about migrating have family members abroad and receive remittances which suggests that intent to migrate is often driven by more than simply having family members who live abroad (Alas & Hernandez, 2020).

These studies sample from geographically and demographically limited subpopulations and may not reflect broader trends among Honduran migrants and potential migrants. Nevertheless, together they raise an intriguing hypothesis that the most important impact of knowing previous migrants is that it increases Hondurans' capability to migrate. This makes intuitive sense: the circle of people one for whom one is willing to risk everything in order to be permanently reunited tends to be quite small. On the other hand, the circle of people of whom one is willing to ask advice and perhaps a favor or two tends to be more extensive.

Two of the most rigorous studies we examined suggest that Hondurans who have both experienced violence (increasing their intent to migrate) and who have ties to migrant networks (giving them a greater capability to migrate than less-connected peers) are among the most likely to migrate.

The chart below (Figure 5), reproduced from (Cordova & Hiskey, 2019), illustrates how the confluence of crime victimization and family ties to Hondurans who have already migrated relate to Hondurans' intent to migrate. Hondurans who both have been victims of crime and have ties to migrant networks are twenty percentage points more likely to report an intention to migrate compared with those who report only one of these two characteristics,

and nearly forty percentage points more likely to intend to migrate than respondents who have neither been victims nor received remittances.

Figure 5: Family ties and crime victimization in relation to migration intentions



Reproduced from (Cordova & Hiskey, 2019)

Clemens (2017) suggests that violence and migrant networks may act together to produce "a self-reinforcing 'snowball' phenomenon: It is affected by current violence but once begun it can continue in part from the inertia created by network effects."

According to Clemens' model, as violence increases, motivating more residents of a given municipality to migrate, these migrants of today become part of an expanded network for tomorrow's migrants to take advantage of. Even if violence stabilizes or decreases, potentially lowering the number of people with the intent to migrate, the expanded network of previous migrants makes it easier (increases the capability) for those who intend to migrate to do so.

Clemens estimates that "in a typical municipality with double the average homicide rate, it only takes an increase of four in the stock of previous UACs to raise the per-year flow of new UACs by one" (Clemens, 2017).

Education and Migration

Intuitively, one might expect that compared to those living in more desperate situations, wealthier and more highly educated Hondurans would have less motivation to migrate. On the other hand, wealthier and more highly educated Hondurans might be expected to have a greater capability to migrate.

Two LAPOP-based studies found that having more years of education was positively correlated with an intention to migrate. Hiskey J. T., Cordova, Malone, & Orces (2018) found that individuals with higher education levels and individuals who were employed were more likely to report intention to migrate. Women from the North of Central America who responded to the AmericasBarometer survey and both had been victims of crime and intended to migrate reported having completed more years of education on average, compared with women who had not been victims of crime or who did not intend to migrate (Hiskey, Cordova, Malone, & Orces, 2021).

One weakness of the LAPOP-based studies is that this survey only asks about intent to migrate in general, without distinguishing between respondents' views on documented versus undocumented migration.

A 2015 study by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and a 2020 USAID study address this nuance. The IADB study surveyed a sample representative of 16 of Honduras' 18 territorial departments. The USAID study surveyed a representative sample of households from specific neighborhoods where USAID programs were being implemented The programs were in five municipalities: Distrito Central (Tegucigalpa), San Pedro Sula, Choloma, La Ceiba, and Tela. Both studies found that individuals with higher educational attainment were more likely to express intent to migrate in general but that individuals with lower educational attainment were more likely to be willing to engage in undocumented migration. Both studies also found that being male, being younger, actively looking for a job, and having friends or family already in the U.S. were positively correlated with willingness to participate in undocumented migration (Qujida & Sierra, 2015; USAID - MESCLA, 2020).

Together, these studies suggest that Hondurans with higher educational attainment have a greater capability to determine the course of their lives, whether that be remaining in Honduras or migrating legally. On the other hand, Hondurans with lower educational attainment may have less capability to obtain the type of life they aspire to if they remain at home and may thus be more willing to engage in undocumented migration.

Social Cohesion

Researchers have also attempted to understand how Hondurans' sense of attachment or

belonging to their local community may be related to migration. Observers have theorized that Hondurans who feel more attachment to their community may be less likely to migrate.

This issue is particularly relevant given the extent to which many Hondurans do not perceive themselves to be surrounded by safe and trustworthy communities. UNAH's 2018 survey found that while 83.6% of respondents said they feel safe at home, 54.0% said they feel least safe or unsafe in public spaces, and 64.1% said they feel unsafe in public transportation. Additionally, 42.4% of respondents said they have no trust or low trust in other people.

Danielson´s 2020 paper, US Border Apprehensions and Community and Place Attachment in Honduras, one of the most rigorous studies we reviewed, used voter participation rates and homeownership rates as proxies for levels of "community attachment" in each of Honduras' 298 municipalities. This analysis found that U.S. border apprehension rates per 100,000 were lower in municipalities with higher scores of community attachment (Danielson M., US Border Apprehensions and Community and Place Attachment in Honduras, 2020). Specifically, municipalities with higher voter participation rates and those with higher homeownership rates had lower migration rates.

A MESCLA and Honduran Local Governance (HLG) survey found that migration intentions were one-third lower among respondents who rated municipal services as good, compared to those who rated them as "very bad" (USAID-MESCLA, 2019).

A 2019 World Vision analysis found that youths who regularly attend religious services are three times less likely to migrate. The study's accuracy may have been affected by the fact that information on youth migrants was not provided by the youths themselves, but rather by 300 parents, relatives, or other adults who knew beneficiaries of the organization's youth program who had migrated to another part of Honduras or to another country (World Vision, 2019). World Vision also surveyed 71 youths as a comparison group. The findings cannot be generalized given the small sample size, the fact that all surveyed are part of World Vision's interventions, and the fact that information on migrant youth was relayed via adult intermediaries. Nonetheless, it does suggest that participation in religious organizations and other community organizations may be a variable worth paying more attention to in future studies.

Family, Community Resources and Capability to Migrate

Several key points emerge from the review above.

First, there is a strong correlation between having friends and family abroad and being likely to migrate oneself. Several surveys show that the proportion of migrants who cite their primary motivation as family reunification is substantially smaller than the proportion who

relied on aid and advice from friends and relatives in the process of migrating. These studies suggest that migrant networks are a key factor influencing Hondurans' capacity to migrate, but likely play a smaller role in their intention to do so.

Put another way, the studies we reviewed suggest that when Hondurans are faced with violence or economic hardship, they are more likely to pursue the specific coping mechanism of emigration when they have more ready access to this option via connections with previous migrants. As Hiskey J. T., Cordova, Malone, & Orces (2018) note: "It appears that regardless of whether one is driven by economic or security reasons to consider emigration, having a friend or relative sending remittances makes emigration a more viable life strategy."

On the other hand, Hondurans who are faced with violence or economic hardship, but who do not have as ready access to migration networks, may be more likely to cope with these situations using strategies other than emigration.

Second, Hondurans with lower levels of education are more likely to consider participating in undocumented migration. However, Hondurans with higher educational attainment are more likely to consider migrating in general.

Third, several studies suggest that Hondurans who are more engaged with their local communities, through home ownership, voting or involvement in religious organizations, and those who feel their local governments are responsive to their needs are less likely to emigrate.

Complex Interactions between Violence and Migration: Data

As we noted earlier in this section, many of the studies we reviewed modeled crime rates and individual experiences of violent crimes as inputs correlated with an output of migration.

However, this is not the only possible relationship between these two phenomena. It is possible that emigration from Honduras could contribute to violence in Honduras. It is also possible that migration and violence may both be the results of a common set of other factors. A handful of studies we reviewed examined these alternative models of the relationship between violence and migration.

Migration and Violence: A Vicious Circle?

Several studies suggest that emigration from Honduras may not only respond to violence but

also contribute to causing it. One way migration might contribute to violence is that when parents emigrate but leave their children behind, these children may be traumatized and as a result, may be more likely to engage in violent behavior as they grow older. In Williams & Castellanos' 2020 interview-based study, "both male and female youth emphasize the disruption to family processes as a primary driver of violence", and several interviewees identified the absence of parents due to migration as one of these disruptors. As one interviewee stated, "To me, there are various factors [that influence violent behavior in children]. For some it is the influence of the parents, because some migrate to the States, and so nobody is caring for them" (Williams & Castellanos, 2020).

Williams & Castellanos' study was based on a small sample from a distinct geographic and demographic population (20 male and 20 female high-school students between the ages of 13 and 24, from Santa Rosa de Copán). Its findings are therefore not generalizable. However, the potential link posited between absent emigree parents and youth engagement in violence is interesting and merits further study.

Cordova & Hiskey (2019) explore another way in which migration may contribute to violence: when migrants abroad send remittances back to their families, their families' increased wealth relative to others in their communities may attract the attention of criminals and make remittance recipients more likely to experience crime.

Cordova & Hiskey pooled together AmericasBarometer survey responses from Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala across three survey waves (2012, 2014, and 2016/17). Using a multivariate model controlling for age, education, and other factors, the researchers found that on average across all three countries and all three survey waves:

> "Individuals who report receiving remittances have a probability of being victimized by crime of 28.3%, compared to 22.19% among non-recipients. This represents a statistically significant difference of over six percentage points, lending support to our hypothesis that remittance recipients are more likely targets of crime than their non-recipient counterparts."

The researchers also note that:

> "As the extent of gang neighborhood control [measured via enumerators' notes on the amount of graffiti in neighborhoods

> where surveys were applied] increases, the probability of being victimized by crime goes up for both remittance recipients and non-recipients. This effect, though, is much stronger for remittance recipients. In neighborhoods where interviewers did not observe gang graffiti, the probability of being a victim of crime for remittance recipients is 26.3 percent. This probability increases to 49 percent in neighborhoods where interviewers reported "very much" graffiti."

Finally, Comisión Interinstitucional para la Protección de las Personas Desplazadas Internamente por la Violencia´s 2019 study, in the top tier of the studies we reviewed in terms of methodological rigor, found that while internally displaced people (IDPs) move to escape violence, the trauma of these moves often exposes them to further violence and increases other risk factors associated with violence victimization and irregular migration.

Specifically, the study found that IDP households experienced violence in their new place of residence at over twice the rate of comparison households (20% of IDPs reported a direct experience of violence in the past year, compared with 9% of the comparison households).

IDP households also experienced increases in other risk factors. Half of adults (18+) and one-third of minors (0-17) in IDP households were reported as experiencing negative health impacts. Negative psychological impacts were reported by 35% of IDP households. 38% of 0–17-year-olds had their studies interrupted and another 11% dropped out of school. Between a quarter and a third of IDP households reported losing homes, land, crops,or businesses they had owned before being displaced. IDP households displaced within the five years before the survey were less likely to be involved in social or religious organizations. 35% were not involved in any such organizations, compared to 29% of comparison households.

According to other studies, crime victimization, negative changes in family finances, and a sense of disconnect from the surrounding community are all correlated with migration. Further research is needed to clarify the extent to which both the initial traumas motivating internal displacement and the secondary traumas caused by displacement may lead some IDPs to later emigrate.

Migration and Violence: Causes and Solutions

Some research suggests that, in addition to violence causing migration or vice versa, both violence and migration can be understood as symptoms of other factors.

Individual-level factors related to emotional regulation and resilience, relational factors such as family environment, community-level factors such as gang presence, and societal factors like access to education and employment have all been linked with increased risk for youths to engage in or be a victim of violence. For example, Cruz, et al. (2020), in their study based on interviews with more than 1,000 Hondurans with a history of gang involvement, found that the root causes of joining a gang "are mostly related to the absence of positive youth development opportunities in their communities, including lack of employment, insufficient access to education, weak family structures, and negative peer influences" (Cruz J. M., et al., 2020)

Assessments of several USAID-funded interventions targeting youths living in high-crime communities in Honduras found that similar factors, such as difficulty regulating emotions, having experienced post-traumatic stress, or having low levels of personal resilience, were also correlated with a higher probability among program participants of self-reported intention to migrate (USAID - MESCLA, 2020).

Since a number of risk factors increase the probability both that Hondurans will experience violence and that they will migrate, programs addressing these factors may simultaneously reduce beneficiaries' risk of experiencing violence and their likelihood of migrating.

In fact, data collected on USAID programs suggest that some interventions reduced beneficiaries' intent to migrate.

Table 2: Migration is lower among USAID beneficiaries

Age Group	18-23	24-29	30-34	+35	Overall Intention to Migrate (weighted by age distribution) LAPOP, survey for FTF and HLG
LAPOP National Average Intention to Migrate	51%	46%	47%	28%	38%
Beneficiaries of Feed the Future (FTF), a US global hunger initiative	16%	14%	12%	9%	12%
Honduran Local Government (HLG) - Western Honduras (USAID Target Communities)	29%	35%	28%	17%	24%

Reproduced from (USAID - MESCLA, 2021)

Another study, focused on USAID interventions in schools, also produced promising results.

Over the course of nine months, Asegurando la Educación collected and analyzed data from 21 schools in Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, Choloma, and La Ceiba. The research team studied Asegurando project documents including monitoring and evaluation data, videos, and reports. They also conducted fieldwork consisting of 53 focus groups and 127 key informant interviews with principals, teachers, counselors, parents, and students. The study collected data on 332 students, ages 12 to 16, identified by their teachers and counselors as high-risk because they were on the cusp of dropping out and could likely join gangs or migrate without documents.

Over the course of the intervention, the number of high-risk students who planned to migrate without documents dropped by 51% (USAID - Asegurando la Educación, 2020).

Assessments of three other USAID interventions including GENESIS, *Empleando Futuros*, and *Proponte Mas* found a statistically significant improvement among participants on measures related to emotional regulation, trauma, resilience, and social cohesion. These are factors which other studies have shown to be associated with lower probabilities of migrating and of experiencing violence (USAID, 2020; Katz, Decker, Cheon, & Stuewe-Portnoff, 2019; USAID - MESCLA, 2020).

Other recent studies suggest that Hondurans' trust in government institutions, a factor which may be linked both with intention to migrate and intention to engage in crime, may be responsive to interventions. ASJ (2020) found that witnesses and victims of crimes who had more positive interactions with police officers reported having higher confidence in the national police as an institution. The study results suggest that relatively simple and inexpensive police actions like taking notes when interviewing witnesses and victims, telling them what the next steps of the investigation would be, and calling them to inform them on the case's progression may produce a sizeable positive effect on these witnesses' and victims' perceptions of the police institution (VerBeek & Daugaard, 2020).

Complex Relationship between Migration and Violence: Conclusions

Several key points emerge from the review above.

First, migration and internal displacement may be causes of violence in addition to being responses to it. Youths left behind in Honduras by parents who have emigrated may be at greater risk of both perpetrating and being victims of violence. Remittances sent by migrant family members may increase recipients' risk of being targeted by gang members and other criminals. Internal displacement, a response to violence, may result in further trauma that may increase IDPs' risk of experiencing further violence and their likelihood of migrating.

Second, various adverse conditions put individuals at greater risk both of migrating and of engaging in or experiencing violence. Interventions funded by USAID in Honduras have decreased participants' stated intent to migrate and have also increased protective factors that make beneficiaries both less likely to experience violence and less likely to migrate.

CONCLUSIONS

Our review suggests that personal experiences of negative events related to violence or economics, such as being threatened by a gang or working in the coffee industry during a global price downturn, are among the most important factors contributing to Hondurans' intent to migrate. Among individuals who have experienced such shocks, those with the least faith in the Honduran government's ability or willingness to protect and provide for them are most likely to intend to migrate. And individuals who have family or friends who have already migrated are more likely to be capable of following through on their migration intentions.

One implication for policy is that to reduce Hondurans' intent to migrate, it will likely be necessary not only to reduce crime and improve economic opportunities, but also to increase Hondurans' trust in their government's ability to protect and provide for them if they do experience threats to their livelihoods and safety.

It would be useful to carry out further research on the extent to which Hondurans' interactions with government officials and programs after experiencing threats to their safety or livelihoods correlate with decisions to migrate or stay at home. For example, are Hondurans threatened by gangs more likely to remain in Honduras if the police call them frequently to provide updates on their investigation? Are Hondurans who receive aid from the Honduran government to relocate internally in response to a threat more likely to remain in the country?

Our review suggests that capability, based especially on individuals' connections to family and friends who have already migrated, is a key factor differentiating those who migrate from those who remain in Honduras. Many Hondurans who lack the capability to migrate experience the same threats to their livelihoods and safety, but cope using strategies other than migration.

Further research to investigate and assess the variety of coping mechanisms Hondurans use when confronted with violence and economic hardship could shed light on possible alternatives to migration.

4. LANDSCAPE REVIEW OF TOOLS AND METHODS

SECTION OVERVIEW

In this section, we will develop a recommendation for a tool that helps to identify individuals, households, and communities at a higher risk for violence and migration in Honduras. This tool seeks to respond to a context in Honduras and neighboring countries, in which violence and migration rates have been rising in recent years, causing great suffering. The tool's development is based on the framework presented in section one of this study and on the findings of the extant data analysis presented in section two.

The first section of this study presented us with the Capabilities-Intentions Framework. This framework was shown to provide a systemic approach to assessing the objective conditions, relationships, and characteristics that determine an individual´s or household's capacity to migrate or stay (capability) and how an individual or a household perceives their future and life chances (intentions). We also showed that the framework can be useful because it uses potential migrants' subjective determination of vulnerability and imagined costs and benefits of staying or leaving, bringing their agency, resources, and connections into conversation with their assessment and interpretation of the economic, social, and political conditions both at home and in their potential destination.

Section two of the report built on the first by allowing us to identify the risk and protective factors for violence and migration. Through the review of quantitative studies and data sets, the section directed us toward the factors found to be more connected to the vulnerability of individuals and households that increases the risk of violence and migration as well as factors connected to the capability to respond in different ways. Furthermore, the factors defined are key in our review of tools and methods as they become one of the main criteria in searching for a tool for possible adoption, adaptation, or extension in the Honduran context. Based on the data presented in section two and using the framework introduced in section one, including the Socio-Ecological Model of Human Development (SEM), in this section we list and describe specific risk and protective factors at the individual-household, community and national levels.

The Capability-Intentions Framework and the factors identified through the extant data analysis will be the center of our review of tools and methods. The framework allows us to establish two important considerations when assessing the risk of violence and migration. First, it indicates the importance of considering and identifying factors related to migrants' capability to stay or to leave. Second, it allows us to recognize the importance of a more subjective, but equally important calculation, intentions. In the context of the

Capability-Intentions Framework, we will understand the impact of different risk and protective factors on the risk of violence and migration. For example, we will see that an individual's direct experience of violence increases their risk for further victimization and migration. However, whether they migrate will depend on both the strength of that intention and on their capability to migrate, which for example will be stronger if they have family connections in the destination country.

Throughout this section we further present and discuss the several risk and protective factors identified at the individual, household, community, and national levels that have been shown to be connected to violence and migration. Understanding these factors will give us a clear image of what to look for in a tool to properly assess the risk for violence and migration in Honduras.

An evidence-based tool like the one we are developing in this chapter is relevant not only for academic researchers but also for practitioners and policy makers. A tool like this will allow for the collection of more data and empirical evidence that academic researchers can use to better understand why some individuals are more likely to be impacted by violence or to migrate. So far, the discussion on the connection between violence and migration has been largely anecdotal rather than evidence-driven.

The tool or tool set suggested is intended to target interventions to those individuals, households, and communities at greater risk and is designed to help evaluate the success of those interventions by determining whether a particular intervention has led to a decrease in the risk as well as the rates of violence and migration.

High rates of migration and violence have caused great suffering among families in Honduras and limited access to a safe life with opportunities for people to flourish at home. Through a tool like the one we recommend, researchers and practitioners can further work towards developing solutions that reduce the suffering and the pressure that several factors place on people, leaving them with only two options: staying put and risking violence or migrating to find a safer home. Reducing the risk for violence and migration will contribute to more people in Honduras living a dignified life at home.

We will begin this section with an overview of the concepts used in our assessment of tools and methods. Following that, we will present and discuss the factors identified based on the data presented in section two and using the framework introduced in section one. In addition to that, we will present other criteria we found to be relevant in this review. Once that has been laid out, we will go over all the tools and methods we reviewed; briefly describing each tool, especially in relation to the criteria identified. A part of this section will discuss the tool that we concluded would be most helpful based on how it fulfilled the criteria established, as well as components from other tools reviewed whose adaptation should be considered and potentially adapted.

USEFUL CONCEPTS FOR THE REVIEW OF TOOLS AND METHODS

The concepts used in this section are widely known and used in youth risk and need assessments in Latin America and the Caribbean. However, we believe it is important to review some of these and how they are used for the purpose of this section.

Risk and Protective Factors

Factors are, in general, elements or characteristics that impact an individual, household and community either in a positive or negative way. For example, risk factors are characteristics that precede and are associated with higher likelihood of negative outcomes (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2019). In this study, those are factors linked to a higher likelihood that an individual will be impacted by violence or will migrate. We primarily identify those risk factors at the individual, household and community level. Furthermore, in our assessment, risk factors are listed in two ways: static or dynamic risk. Static risk factors are those that might predict a negative outcome but cannot be changed (Koetzle, Mellow, Piñol, & Pugliese, 2021). For example, the age of an individual is a static factor. In contrast, dynamic risk factors predict the negative outcome and can change. We will see that living in a community with high crime rates and strong gang presence is a dynamic risk factor in assessing the likelihood of violence and migration.

In our study, we attempt to use a human rights approach to risk factors for violence and migration. This means that the risk factors identified should not be considered or used to profile individuals or groups, as this might cause governments and authorities to target detention or other forms of punishment or deterrence on specific groups such as young men and women with specific characteristics, only because they seem to fit the "profile". Instead, our intention in identifying risk factors is to use them to identify the groups most at-risk in order to take steps to protect them and diminish those risks.

Protective factors are characteristics associated with a lower likelihood of negative outcomes or that reduce a risk factor's impact. Protective factors may be seen as positive countering events (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2019). Protective factors are elements that buffer individual, household, or community resiliency even when presented with adverse circumstances. They decrease the vulnerability of actors to negative outcomes; in this case, they decrease the risk of violence and migration. For example, literacy is almost always a protective factor (International Organization on Migration, 2019).

Some specific factors, whether they are risk factors or protective factors, are context specific. For example, being a member of a church may protect young men from gang recruitment in some parts of Latin America but not in others. Similarly, being a member of a particular racialized group may be a protective factor in some contexts (if that group is dominant or privileged), but a risk factor in others (if that group is marginalized or oppressed).

The Socio-Ecological Model (SEM)

The Socio-Ecological Model conceptualizes and helps to understand the relationship between factors at different personal and environmental scales that affect the individual. The SEM provides a useful structure for analyzing factors affecting capabilities and intentions that result in changes in the risk for violence or migration. We have used the SEM model to categorize all risk and protective factors for violence and migration on three different scales: individual-household, community, and national (structural and societal). Individual-household level risk and protective factors, in our review, will be those directly experienced by the individual and that result in a change of capabilities and intentions. Community-level risk and protective factors will be characteristics in the community that result in a change in the capabilities and intentions of individuals. At the national level, we will list indicators on factors that are shown to result in changes of capabilities and intentions of individuals.

Tools and Methods

Tools are instruments that help to identify the level of risk. These instruments usually provide a risk score or risk rating. Tools usually allow risk assessment by previously identifying certain behaviors, characteristics, activities, and circumstances that are related to increased risk (Koetzle, Mellow, Piñol, & Pugliese, 2021). The intention of our study was to identify existing tools that assess risk for violence and migration. However, we did not find any tools that specifically measured risk for those outcomes. Therefore, we took a broader look and found 11 tools and toolkits. These are instruments that mostly have been tested or validated and that, in some way, identify risk factors associated with negative outcomes like violence and migration. These tools and toolkits have been used or built mainly for informing practitioners and not for academic research. These tools also present specific domains for measuring each factor. We did not include in our assessment tools that required clinical applications to assess mental health or actuarial tools designed to be used for criminal proceedings or in institutional settings.

Methods refer to the mechanisms and practices developed to apply the tools. These are the activities through which the data is collected. Surveys and questionnaires, interviews, focus groups, observation, and secondary data sources are all different methods of applying a tool

for collecting information. Through our review, we also paid attention to the methodology used to apply each tool.

RISK AND PROTECTIVE FACTORS IDENTIFIED

Drawing from the data analysis in section two, we identified ten risks and nine protective factors connected to violence and/or migration. The factors identified are elements or characteristics that contribute to creating more vulnerability or resilience to both violence and migration. Below we present and discuss how these factors were selected, what they are, and how they are helpful in understanding violence, migration, and the connection between them.

The factors that were tested in different studies and that were found to have a strong relation with risk for violence and risk for migration were those selected to be part of the principal criteria in our assessment. From the 37 studies reviewed in section 2, we focused on those that had clearly found factors that contributed to understanding the shift in capabilities that make people vulnerable to violence or to migration. Similarly, we selected factors that contribute to understanding the intentions part of our framework. These are frequently factors that measure a response to a circumstance around the time the individual is expiring it or its effects.

Depending on the description of each of those factors and based on the SEM model, in our review they are placed either at the individual-household level or at the community level. Out of the 10 risk factors identified, 8 of those factors were found to have an impact on the individual-household level. On the other hand, two were found to have an impact on the community level. For the nine protective factors, six were found to impact at the individual-household level, and three on the community level. We also list later in this section 12 risk and protective factors that should be understood at the national level. Although our goal was to identify the factors that explained the causes of both violence and migration, we did not discard factors that explained just one or the other of those outcomes. There is a horizontal connection between violence and migration, and we want the tool we propose to include factors that have shown to be connected to one another and to continue to test the relationship between them.

Risk Factors

Individual-household Level		Related to		Source
	Risk Factor	Violence	Migration	
1	Direct victimization or victimization in the household	X	X	Hiskey and Cordova, 2019; Graham and Markowitz, 2011; Abuelifa, del Carmen, & Ruiz-Arranz, 2019; GOH, 2019; Creative Associates, 2020; Hiskey J., Decision Points, 2018; Hiskey, Cordova, et al 2018; Hiskey J., Cordova, Malone, & Orces, 2021; Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2017; Women Refugee Committee, 2012; Keller, et al., 2017; GOH/UNHCR, 2019; CONADEH, 2019; Comisión Interinstitucional para la Protección de Personas Desplazadas por la Violencia, 2015; NRC, 2017/2018/2019/2020 .
2	Receiving remittances	X	X	Cordova & Hiskey, 2019; Hiskey J., 2019; Danielson, 2020; Hiskey J.T., Cordova, Malone, & Orces, 2018; Clements, 2017; Alas & Hernandez, 2020; OMIH, 2016
3	Age: 15-30	X	X	Pavón, 2017; Creative Associates, 2019; Observatorio Nacional de la Violencia, 2020; Hiskey, 2019.
4	Gender: being a woman	X	X	Hiskey, Córdova, Malone and Orcés, 2021; Creative Associates, 2019; Fondo Centroamericano de Mujeres, 2019.
5	Direct experience of corruption		X	Hiskey, Córdova, Malone and Orcés, 2021; Hiskey, 2019; MESCLA, 2021
6	Low trust in government institutions		X	Hiskey, Córdova, Malone, & Orcés, 2021; Danielson, 2020; IUDPAS, 2019; USAID, 2019; Hiskey, Córdova, Malone, & Orcés, 2021
7	Subjective sense of not being where you want to be		X	Creative Associates, 2019; Pavon Rodriguez, 2017; USAID, 2019

	economically, not having enough opportunities			
8	Food insecurity		X	Ruiz Soto, et al., 2021
Community Level		**Related to**		**Source**
1	Living in a community with high crime rates or strong gang presence	X	X	Danielson, 2020; Médecins San Frontieres, 2017; Hiskey, Córdova, Malone, & Orcés, 2021; Comisión Interinstitucional para la Protección de las Personas Desplazadas Internamente por la Violencia, 2019
2	Lack of employment opportunities	X	X	Danielson, 2020; Pavon Rodriguez, 2017; William & Castellanos, 2020; Cruz, et al., 2020

Protective Factors

Individual-household Level		**Related to**		**Source**
#	**Protective Factor**	**Violence**	**Migration**	
1	Feeling more connected to community	X	X	Williams & Vaughan, 2020; World Vision, 2019; Danielson, 2020; MacColman, 2016
2	More resilience: personal and professional skills	X	X	Cruz, et al., 2020; USAID, Genesis Performance Evaluation, 2020; (USAID - ASEGURANDO LA EDUCACIÓN, 2020)
3	Education	X	X	USAID, Migration Briefer, 2020; MESCLA, 2021
4	Having higher trust in government		X	Hiskey, Córdova, Malone, & Orcés, 2021; Danielson, 2020; USAID, 2019; IUDPAS, 2019; VerBeek & Daugaard, 2020
5	Being active in church		X	World Vision, 2019
6	Access to food and water		X	Ruiz Soto, et al., 2021

	Community Level	Related to		Source
1	Low crime rate	X	X	Danielson, 2020; Clemens, 2017; Abuelifa, Del Carmen, & Ruiz-Arranz, 2019; Médecins San Frontieres, 2017; Hiskey, Córdova, Malone, & Orcés, 2021; Comisión Interinstitucional para la Protección de las Personas Desplazadas Internamente por la Violencia, 2019
2	More employment opportunities	X	X	Pavon Rodriguez, 2017; William & Castellanos, 2020; Observatorio de la Migración Internacional de Honduras, 2019
3	Higher voter participation rates		X	Danielson, 2020; USAID, 2019

DISCUSSION OF FACTORS AT THE INDIVIDUAL-HOUSEHOLD AND COMMUNITY LEVEL

Risk Factors: Individual-Household Level

Direct Victimization or Victimization in the Household

Sixteen of the studies reviewed in section two found a link between direct violence victimization or victimization in the household with intentions to migrate as well as with further risk to be victimized by violence. Nearly 53% of crime victims reported plans to emigrate and those rates were nearly 15% points higher than those not victimized (Hiskey J., An Analysis of Emigration Intentions among Hondurans, 2019). Another study by Creative Associates found that nearly one-third of survey respondents who have considered migrating from Honduras had a family member or close friend murdered. That same study showed that 61% of those who have considered migrating have been robbed (Creative Associates, 2019). Other studies by MSF, the Honduran Government, Abuelifa, and *Instituto Universitario en Democracia, Paz y Seguridad* make the same case.

The general observation through these findings is that personal experiences with violence increase the risk of becoming a victim of violence and migration. The context of structural violence is a reality that most people face, however, we see that the intentions to migrate are more clearly affected by an experience of violence that impacts the individual or their household directly. In the context of the Capability-Intentions Framework, as an individual

or household is victimized, their intentions to migrate will increase. However, whether they migrate will depend on both the strength of that intention and on their capability to migrate, which for example would be stronger if they have family connections in the destination country. Including this factor in a tool constitutes the timely assessment of an experience that quickly can shift migration intentions, depending on the capabilities of the individuals. As we will see below, this is just one factor which will not only increase an individual's intention to migrate but also their risk for further violence victimization.

As we reviewed the studies and tools, we also collected specific questions, items, and indicators used to gather information on the factors identified. For the risk factor "direct victimization or victimization in the household" we present the items identified in the table below.

Have you been a victim of a crime in the last 12 months? In other words, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, aggression, fraud, blackmailing, or threats in the last 12 months?	(Hiskey J., An Analysis of Emigration Intentions among Hondurans, 2019)
Intends to migrate and has been exposed to at least two acts of crime or violence. Does not intend to migrate but has been exposed to at least two acts of crime o violence.	(Creative Associates, 2019)
Which experience with violence pushed us to make the decision to migrate? (Options: gangs, threats, armed robbery, theft, environment of insecurity).	(Abuelifa, Del Carmen, & Ruiz-Arranz, 2019)
The victimization survey technique measures violence actually "experienced" by people and not only the violence is known through police and other official reports. The survey consists of asking questions directly to people about the acts of violence they have suffered and how they felt about them. The protocol has been adapted for MSF's specific purpose, with a focus on medical/physical health and mental health consequences of violence. It includes three parts: 1) What is the violence experienced by people? 2) What did people do about what they experienced (focus on health)? 3) What direct or indirect impacts did violent experiences have on medical/physical health and mental health?	(Medecins San Frontieres, 2017)

Receiving Remittances

From the review, seven studies explored in-depth the relationship between receiving remittances and the likelihood of migration or being victimized by violence. A study by Creative Associates interviewed individuals in 12 of the municipalities in Honduras that received the most total remittances. The study found that 33% of Honduran respondents in these municipalities wanted to migrate. Nearly a quarter of those who said they have

thought of migrating received remittances (Creative Associates, 2019). Furthermore, Cordova and Hiskey (2019) found that individuals who reported receiving remittances had a probability of being victimized by crime of 28.3%, compared to 22.19% among non-recipients. This represents a statistically significant difference of over 6 percentage points (Córdova & Hiskey, 2019). Data by the AmericasBarometer used for research has also shown a statistically significant difference between the number of people victimized by crime who receive remittances and those victimized who do not.

Receiving remittances will increase the risk for violence and migration at the individual-household level, in the context of the Capability-Intentions Framework and considering the data we reviewed. First, receiving remittances shows connections of an individual to networks in another location, this by itself demonstrates potential higher capabilities and intentions to migrate. People will be inclined to migrate to places where they already have an existing network. Receiving remittances also represents higher capabilities to migrate because of the increased financial resources available to the individual or in the household. Through the data reviewed, we also found that the increased financial capabilities might increase the risk of being victimized by violence. Similarly, an increase in violence will cause a further likelihood to migrate.

The following chart presents the items used in the tools reviewed regarding receiving remittances as a risk factor for violence and migration:

Do you have close friends or family living currently in the United States?	(Hiskey J. , An Analysis of Emigration Intentions among Hondurans, 2019)
How frequently do you communicate with family and friends in the United States? Do you or anyone living at your house receive remittances or other forms of financial assistance from abroad?	(Córdova & Hiskey, 2019)

Age 15 - 30

Four of the studies reviewed explored age, specifically being between 15 and 30 years old, as a risk factor. It is a static factor that has been shown to be linked to more probabilities to migrate and be impacted by violence but that cannot be addressed through an intervention. The Creative Associates study presents that "responders ages 18 to 29 years old are more than twice as likely to consider migrating than adults ages 30 and older. The data from Honduras is particularly stark: 46 percent of young adults from the municipalities surveyed

intend to migrate, compared to 28 percent of older adults" (Creative Associates, 2019). Age is a factor that clearly indicates more risk for migration.

Honduras ranks among the 10 countries with the highest crime rates in the world. For 2021, the World Population Review ranks Honduras as the country with the 5 th highest crime rate (Crime Rate by Country 2021, 2021). Furthermore, people between the ages of 15 and 30 are more likely to be victims of violence in the country. Data on crime victimization by *Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Honduras* has shown that more than two in five Honduran murder victims were between the ages of 15 and 29 in 2019 (Observatorio Nacional de la Violencia, 2020). Age is a factor that also indicates risk for violence.

Age, specifically between 15-30, will increase the risk for violence and migration at the individual level in the context of the Capabilities-Intentions Framework, considering the data reviewed. Age might increase capabilities to migrate as young adults might have more physical strength to complete any sort of journey to a new destination. Additionally, their physical strength might make them more likely to better compete in the job market, especially as an immigrant. On the other hand, the connection between age and violence victimization might be linked to the presence of gangs and organized crime. Furthermore, age is a factor that permits a narrowing down of the scope of the population to target through programs in the attempt to address the risk for violence and migration.

Gender

Our review found that in three studies, gender is explored as an important factor to consider for measuring risk for violence and migration. Creative Associates (2019) presented a significant difference between the percentage of young women that plan to migrate to Honduras, compared to the percentage of young men. While 51.3% of women expressed an intention to migrate, only 40.7% of men expressed the same (Creative Associates, 2019). This is a difference of more than 10%. It is important to note that this study looked at the three countries from the North of Central America and only Honduras showed this significant difference. A report by the *Fondo Centroamericano de Mujer* explained that gender-based violence (GBV) may be a significant driver of migration. Their report shows that women who are returned migrants cite violence as a motivation for migrating nearly twice as often as men (Fondo Centroamericano de Mujeres, 2019).

The data reviewed showed that women are at increased risk for violence and migration, in the context of the Capabilities-Intentions Framework. The gender factor responds to our Capabilities-Intentions Framework, especially when approached from a social exclusion perspective. In a highly patriarchal and machista society, women and other genders apart

from cisgender men might be excluded from access to basic capabilities for the enjoyment of their rights. This might shift intentions to migrate as well as increase their vulnerability to violence. This factor should be further studied by collecting data accounting for different forms of gender identity and expression. Comprehensive items to incorporate the gender factor will allow researchers to better assess the risk for violence and migration.

Direct Experience of Corruption

In our review, we identified four studies that presented direct experience of corruption as a risk factor for migration at the individual-household level. Hiskey et al. (2021) found that in the same way that those that experienced crime in the last 12 months, respondents victimized by corruption expressed emigration intentions at a significantly higher rate than those who had not been asked for a bribe or victimized by crime. This study found that over 50% of those victimized by corruption expressed intentions to migrate (Hiskey, Córdova, Malone, & Orcés, 2021). Two other surveys analyzed by MESCLA found similar results. A LAPOP survey found that individuals who had directly experienced crime, corruption and who were dissatisfied with democracy were 1.7 times more likely to intend to migrate than non-victims who were not satisfied. The FHI 360 survey found that those who experienced corruption and who were dissatisfied with democracy were three times more likely to intend to migrate than non-victims who were not dissatisfied (MESCLA, 2021).

The direct experience of corruption will increase the risk for migration, at the individual-household level, in the context of the Capabilities-Intentions Framework and considering the data we have reviewed. First, corruption could pose a threat to capabilities by stealing resources from individuals and households that they would use to survive. This threat, however, would increase intentions to migrate as experiences of corruption change the perception of individuals about their future and life chances in Honduras. Corruption might also further increase intentions to migrate when it relates to violence. For example, if the police force is corrupt it will fail to properly respond to violence victimization experienced by individuals and households. This will further increase intentions to migrate.

The following chart presents the items used in the tools reviewed regarding receiving remittances as a risk factor for violence and migration:

Did a police officer ask you for a bribe in the last 12 months? In the last 12 months, did a public employer ask you for a bribe? In the last year, have you paid any additional amount of money to process a permit in your town?	(Hiskey J., An Analysis of Emigration Intentions among Hondurans, 2019)

In your job, have you had to pay a bribe in the last 12 months? Have you paid any bribes to a court in the last 12 months? In the last 12 months, have you paid a bribe to access service at a hospital or public health clinic? In the last 12 months, did you have to pay a bribe to a public school or university?	

Low Trust in Government Institutions

In our review, we identified four studies that presented low trust in government institutions as a risk factor for migration at the individual-household level. The studies explain that when people trust government institutions they are less likely to migrate. Hiskey et al. (2021) show that individuals who have been victimized by crime in the last twelve months and that have emigration intentions have the lowest level of satisfaction with democracy. While non-victims of crime with no intentions to migrate show 57.8% of satisfaction with democracy, crime victims with intentions to migrate show 42.5% of satisfaction with democracy (Hiskey, Córdova, Malone, & Orcés, 2021). This same study shows that individuals who have been victimized by crime and who have intentions to migrate report lower levels of belief that politicians will be responsive to the public. Satisfaction with democracy and belief in the responsiveness of politicians are two indicators that demonstrate the relationship between lack of trust in government institutions with intentions to migrate.

Low trust in government institutions is a risk factor for migration at the individual-household level in the context of the Capabilities-Intentions Framework and the data reviewed. Low trust in government institutions increases intentions to migrate. Lack of trust implies less hope for the future in Honduras which pushes people to leave. Furthermore, less trust in government institutions might be the result of poor provision of government services. That translates into an impact on the capabilities of individuals and households to live a good life where they are. For example, being a victim of violence or corruption and not having the government respond in the way it is supposed to shows a lack of capability to confront those challenges, potentially producing a higher intention to migrate. In contrast, good government services, such as good schools, health care and security, increase capabilities for individuals and households to have a good life where they are, decreasing intentions to migrate.

The following chart presents the tools reviewed regarding low trust in government as a risk factor for violence and migration:

Questions asked among four groups: 1.non-victim, non-emigrant. 2. non-victim, emigrant. 3.Victim, non-emigrant. 4.Victim, emigrant. Satisfaction with democracy (Satisfied/Very Satisfied). Politicians are interested in what people like you think (Strongly disagree).	(Hiskey, Córdova, Malone, & Orcés, 2021)

Subjective Sense of Not Being Where You Want to be Economically and Not Having Enough Opportunities

Three of the studies reviewed explored this as a risk factor for migration at the individual-household level, within the umbrella of economic concerns. The findings of a study by Creative Associates (2019) show that in the 60 high-migration municipalities that applied to the survey, economics is the principal factor that differentiates those who do intend to migrate from those who do not. In Honduras, 67% of respondents cited economic-related concerns as the primary reason for migration. They particularly observe that a "pessimistic outlook" explains much of the difference between those who intend to migrate and those who do not. For example, the study shows that in Honduras believing that the household is worse off than it was the previous year makes individuals 1.5 times more likely to consider migrating. Their findings show that in La Ceiba, Honduras, 71% of those who have considered migrating think their economic situation will be worse next year, compared to 39% who have not considered migrating but feel the same (Creative Associates, 2019). This factor shows specific economic-related concerns that increase the risk for migration and that should be targeted through interventions.

A subjective sense of not being where one wants to be economically and of not having enough opportunities clearly increases risk for migration in the context of the Capabilities-Intentions Framework. This factor plays a role in the calculations individuals make on the costs and benefits of staying or leaving. It alters the way they perceive their capabilities to stay and this results in a pessimistic perception about their future and life chances in their current communities, increasing their intentions to migrate. Through our review, we identified that the items that allow individuals to compare their current

economic situation to past and future perceptions might help measure this factor successfully. Simultaneously, we observed that those responses contribute to understanding the risk for migration when connecting them to individuals' intentions to migrate.

Food Insecurity

The 2021 study, *Charting a New Regional Course of Action: The Complex Motivations and Costs of Central American Migration,* clearly showed the relationship between food insecurity and higher risk for migration. Data collected for the study showed that "although the desire to migrate consistently stood around 70% of respondents independent of their level of hunger, respondents with higher levels of hunger reported planning and preparing to migrate at higher levels" (Ruiz Soto, et al., 2021). These findings demonstrate that hunger is a factor that clearly increases the likelihood of migration. They mention that hungry people move more quickly from intentions to migrate to making plans and arrangements.

In the context of the Capabilities-Intentions Framework, we further understand the relationship between food insecurity and risk for migration. Hunger clearly demonstrates a lack of capability by an individual to meet his or her basic needs. This implies that the place they find themselves in jeopardizes their survival. We can expect this to increase intentions to migrate, as individual households will look for a destination where their basic needs and further desires can be fulfilled. Hunger has a large negative impact on individuals-households' quality of life, quickly making them move towards migration.

In summary, at the individual level, in the context of the Capabilities-Intentions Framework, we have presented eight risk factors for violence and migration. Direct victimization or victimization in the household, receiving remittances, being between 15 and 30 years of age, and being a woman are factors that our data review showed to increase risk for violence and migration. Direct experience of corruption, low trust in government institutions, the subjective sense of not being where you want to be economically, not having enough opportunities, and food insecurity were factors that we identified to increase risk for migration.

Risk Factors: Community Level

Living in a Community with Higher Levels of Criminality or Strong Gang Presence

In our review, we found that four studies identified living in a community with high crime rates as a risk factor for violence and migration. Clements (2019) shows that an increase of 1.08 homicides per year on average, sustained across four years in a child migrant's municipality of origin caused one additional unaccompanied child apprehension at the United States border. Furthermore, the results showed that if the increase in murders is sustained, it continues to cause one additional unaccompanied child apprehension every year on average (Clemens M. , 2017). Generally, the findings show that the communities with a higher murder rate in Honduras are the communities that also present a higher risk for violence and migration.

Homicide rates are commonly used as a proxy for measuring crime. Communities with high murder rates are most of the time also communities with high crime rates or strong gang presence. For example, killings by gangs in Central America are closely associated with other crimes. Data from crime victimization surveys in the North of Central America, Hiskey (2019) shows that reports of murders in respondents' neighborhoods are highly correlated with reports of other types of crime. For example, 47% of people reporting murders in their neighborhood also report extortion in the same neighborhood (Hiskey, 2019). This is an interesting finding that provides evidence of the impact of living in a community with high crime rates and the presence of gang groups. However, this discovery only highlights the importance of collecting more data on crime and the presence of criminal groups in a community.

In the context of the Capabilities-Intentions Framework we can see how high rates of crime and strong gang presence increase the risk for violence and migration at the community level. First, crime and gang presence affect capabilities by impacting resources that individuals might have or try to obtain in that community to stay put (i.e., presence of a gang in a neighborhood might increase extortion activities in the area). As a result, the lack of those capacities to maintain or build resources to stay leads to higher intentions to migrate. People from communities impacted by crime will look for other places where they consider having a safe and promising future is more likely.

A tool for assessing the risk for violence and migration must include components that measure this factor at the community level and that go beyond the collection of data on murder. In the discussion of the relationship between violence and migration, previous sections explained that threats or the presence of crimes that repeat over time might lead to greater intention to migrate. Measuring the presence of threats and those sorts of crimes would be of great contribution in a tool.

Lack of Employment Opportunities

Through our review, we found four studies that identified lack of employment opportunities as a risk factor for violence and migration at the community level. In relation to risk for violence, we found that 38% of gang members cite lack of employment opportunities as a challenge for disengagement and reintegration into society (Cruz M. J., et al., 2020). Abuelifa et al. (2019) show that among those who have emigrated for economic reasons, half indicated that they were motivated by a lack of employment in the country (Abuelifa, Del Carmen, & Ruiz-Arranz, 2019). Danielson (2020) found that the average change in the unemployment rate in different Honduran departments was positively associated with migration flows. He used three different models for that calculation and all of them led to similar results (Danielson M., Decomposition Analysis of Violence Compared to Economic and Migrant Network Effects, 2020). The results help to understand the relationship between unemployment and violence or migration, however, more data on specific communities and municipalities is needed.

We can further understand a lack of employment opportunities as a risk for violence and migration at the community level in the context of the Capabilities-Intentions Framework. First, this factor directly represents conditions in the community that imply lower capabilities for individuals to stay put. Lack of employment opportunities represents limited access to resources for survival and economic opportunities. The general lack of employment opportunities in a community translated into a greater likelihood of increased intentions to migrate among the inhabitants of that community. People will be more inclined to move to a place where their capacities to have a good life will be increased and where they will have a better outlook for the future.

A tool for assessing risk for violence and migration must include items or indicators around the level of employment opportunities in a community. We found that currently this data, which would help to better understand trends in particular geographic areas, has not been collected or disseminated enough in Honduras.

Protective Factors: Individual-Household Level

Feeling more Connected to Community

A factor that decreases the risk for violence and migration is community attachment. Through our review, we found four studies that explore its role at the individual level. The underlying concepts of both place and community attachment relate to the extent to which people are "bonded" to the place where they live. In some conceptualizations, this has to do with community members' perceptions that where they live is unique and irreplaceable (Hidalgo & Hernández, 2001). In relation to risk for violence, we found that fear of crime is partially mitigated by increased trust in neighbors and perceptions of community unity, as well as years of residence, which is presumably associated with higher numbers of local friends and acquaintances (MacColman, 2016). Furthermore, Danielson (2020) found that the homeownership rate was one indicator connected to lower migration. His analysis shows that municipalities with higher homeownership sent fewer migrants. Specifically, a municipality with a 1% higher homeownership rate was found to have sent 110 fewer migrants per 100,000 population in Honduras from 2013-2019 (Danielson, 2020). We believe collecting this data on community attachment at the individual level is key for assessing the risk for migration and violence.

In the context of the Capabilities-Intentions Framework, we can further understand how the greater connection to the community has a direct impact on a higher risk for violence and migration. First, we can see that this factor enforces the capability of individuals to prevent or respond to the risk of violence. Furthermore, this factor increases the ability to stay and increases the costs of leaving. This results in lower intentions to migrate. Individuals who own a home or that have strong ties to the community are expected to be less likely to migrate.

The following chart presents the items used in the tools reviewed regarding receiving remittances as a risk factor for violence and migration:

Does anyone in your household own more than 1,000 m2 (0.1 hectares) of agricultural land? Do you own a home?	(Danielson, 2020)

More Resilience: Personal and Professional Skills

Three of the studies reviewed identified resilience as a protective factor for violence and migration at the individual level. The GENESIS activity [5] , evaluated by MESCLA defines personal resilience as "the ability to remain productive and positive when faced with stress, uncertainty, adversity, trauma or tragedy. Personal resilience means one can respond in a robust way to keep functioning, both psychologically and physically" (USAID, Genesis Performance Evaluation, 2020). Personal and professional skills are some of the specific indicators used when looking at resiliency. The results of the GENESIS program show that a 1% increase in resilience leads to a 2% decrease in the probability of a person intending to migrate. Developing resilience or personal and professional skills often requires mentoring. An evaluation by MESCLA on USAID's Safe Learning Spaces, a program that engages educators, students, teachers, and the community at large to make schools healthier and secure learning environments found a 51% reduction in high-risk students planning to migrate after their intervention (USAID - ASEGURANDO LA EDUCACIÓN, 2020).

The Capabilities-Intentions Framework helps us to further understand how resiliency is a protective factor for risk for violence and migration. Resiliency first gives individuals tools that increase their capabilities to respond to risk of violence. Furthermore, resiliency is a factor that has the power to shift the capability of an individual or the way he or she perceives those capabilities, influencing in turn intentions to migrate in favor of staying put. For example, an individual with more personal and professional skills might be able to find and construct opportunities where she currently is, even in a difficult context. Resiliency might help us start answering the question of "why do people stay?" even when experiencing the same levels of poverty, violence, or family networks in the United States.

In the creation of a tool for measuring risk for violence and migration, a comprehensive list of items and indicators to carefully measure resilience at the individual level should be included.

Education

Two reports by USAID in Honduras show that level of education is related to risk for violence and migration. In relation to migration, a study by USAID in Honduras found that individuals who had completed secondary or higher education had lower intentions of migrating than their peers with no formal education or incomplete primary education. The probability of having intentions to migrate for a person with some university education was 9% and for a person with complete secondary education 12%, much lower than the 20% among those who have no formal education or some primary education. Higher education

[5] The GENESIS Activity supports OCs, which are strategically located in physical spaces within high-violence communities. They aim to prevent youth violence through various activities, including skills development, building a life plan, and participation in helping develop the community to which they belong.

results in lower intentions to migrate (MESCLA, 2021). A higher level of education has been found to be connected to a lower risk for violence and migration.

The data also shows that education might be a protective factor against the risk of violence in connection to migration. Migrants from high-crime urban areas are much less educated than average. For example, while 37% of respondents in a victimization survey in high-crime areas reported having completed primary school or less, 54% of returnees from these areas reported completing 6th grade or less (USAID, 2020). Most returned migrants coming from high-crime areas in Honduras had little education and most had not completed secondary education.

In the context of the Capabilities-Intentions Framework we can better understand how a higher level of education represents a protective factor for violence and migration at the individual level. Just like more resiliency (or personal and professional skills), education is also an asset that gives people the capabilities to respond to the risk of violence and to other difficult situations in their context. This means higher capabilities to stay and seek better opportunities where they currently are, this in turn decreases intentions to migrate.

A tool to assess the risk for violence and migration must include items to measure the level of education that the individual has.

Having Higher Trust in Government

From our review, five studies explored higher trust in government institutions as a protective factor at the individual-household level. This has been shown to be a protective factor for the risk of migration. The same data that we presented above when we discussed low trust in government as a risk factor for migration helped us to make this conclusion.

We can better understand how having higher trust in government decreases the risk for migration through the Capabilities-Intentions Framework. Higher trust in government encompasses more satisfaction with democracy and belief in the responsiveness of politicians. This is related to individuals' inability to stay as this might represent more access and quality in the services offered by the State. For example, an individual or household that lives in a community with good quality education, health, and security services enjoys capabilities that might contribute to a more positive perception of the future and life chances. Furthermore, higher trust in the government is a factor that implies a costlier decision to leave, especially when enjoying good quality government-provided services. This reduces intentions to migrate.

A comprehensive tool must include items that allow measurement of trust in government not just as a risk factor, but as a protective factor. Questions about democracy and trust in

politicians are some of the indicators to measure this factor. However, items to understand the presence and quality of other government-provided services must be included. For example, data should be collected on the trust, perception and experiences with specific state institutions like the police, the judicial system, or a public hospital.

Being Active in Church

Participation in groups was identified through our review as a protective factor for migration. A study by World Vision on youth particularly identified that being active in church decreased the likelihood of migration. The model used in the survey found that youth who regularly attend religious services are three times less likely to migrate. The authors of the study explain that regularly attending church implies that people feel part of a community (World Vision, 2019). This means that the individual is connected to a support network with shared values and beliefs.

Looking at this factor from the Capabilities-Intentions Framework we can observe how participating in a group such as church increases capabilities to stay and decreases intentions to migrate. Participating in this sort of community implies access to a network of support. Access to networks is a form of capability that has an impact on the intentions to migrate as leaving a support network might constitute a high cost for migration. Staying put may become the most beneficial option in the calculations by the individual.

It is important that a tool to assess risk for violence and migration incorporates items that measure the participation and access of individuals to social networks of support.

Access to Food and Water

A study published by the International Food Program and the Inter-American Development Bank showed that access to food and water decreased the risk for migration. Their findings show that 37% of all respondents experiencing severe hunger reported plans to migrate, compared to 18% of those who experienced little or no hunger. Furthermore, 23% of all respondents experiencing severe hunger reported having prepared to migrate compared to 7%of those experiencing little to no hunger (Ruiz Soto, et al., 2021). Access to food decreases intentions to migrate, as explored when we discussed food insecurity as a risk factor.

In the context of the Capabilities-Intentions Framework, we can understand how food security is a protective factor for migration at the individual level. Access to food and water is a basic need for human survival that constitutes a basic capability for individuals-households to employ their agency to pursue a better life. The lack of access to

food and water can quickly turn into higher migration intentions as individuals and households will be desperate to have this need met. If individuals and households have this need satisfied where they are, they will be less likely to pursue migration as an avenue in response to other challenges in their context.

Protective Factors: Community Level

Low Crime Rate

From our review, six studies explored the low crime rates as a protective factor at the community level. This has been shown to be a protective factor for the risk of violence and migration. The same data that we presented above when we discussed living in a community with high crime rates or strong gang presence as a risk factor for migration helped us to make this conclusion. A lower crime rate will result in lower migration rates.

The Capabilities-Intentions Framework helps us to further understand how low crime rates constitute a protective factor for risk of violence and migration. This represents capabilities in the community for economic growth and safety. This results in less likelihood of violence as well as less intentions to migrate.

More Employment Opportunities

From our review, four studies explored more employment opportunities as a protective factor at the community level. This has been shown to be a protective factor for the risk of migration. The same data that we presented above when we discussed living in a community with a lack of employment opportunities as a risk factor for migration helped us to make this conclusion. More employment opportunities will result in lower migration rates.

The Capabilities-Intentions Framework helps us to further understand how more employment opportunities constitute a protective factor for the risk of violence and migration. Employment opportunities represent capabilities and an environment of opportunities for economic growth and a dignified life where people are. This results in lower intentions to migrate.

Breaking down data by municipality and specific areas will be helpful in better understanding and measuring the impact of more employment opportunities on migration. A tool for assessing the risk of migration should collect this information at the community level.

Higher Voter Participation Rates

Through our review, we identified two studies that explore higher voter participation rates as a protective factor for the risk of migration. Danielson (2020) explains that social and political commitment to community and country may influence staying put. In his analysis, Danielson hypothesizes that when people "exercise voice" and seek to contribute to making changes in their communities, they are less likely to migrate. Using voting participation as a proxy for broader civic engagement, their findings show that municipalities with higher voter participation rates sent fewer migrants. Through one of the models used in the study, they found that a 1 percentage point increase in the participation rate across the 2013 and 2017 electoral periods predicted a decrease of almost 180 migrants per 10,000 population over the period between 2013 and 2019 (Danielson, 2020). Also, one of their specific findings is that municipalities that became more participatory from 2013 to 2017 were also less likely to send migrants.

We can understand the effect of higher voter participation, as a protective factor for risk of migration, through the Capabilities-Intentions Framework. Higher voter participation rates reflect an assessment and interpretation of their realities that show a belief that circumstances can change and get better where they are. This hope decreases intentions to migrate and increases the likelihood of staying put as individuals perceive positive future and life chances in their current community.

A tool to assess the risk for violence and migration must include items and indicators to understand the level of voter participation and overall social and political commitment in particular communities across the country. This factor has not been discussed much in relation to migration, but this study has found that it should be part of any attempt to understand and assess the risk for migration.

CRITERIA FOR THE REVIEW OF TOOLS AND METHODS

This section presents the criteria we considered as we reviewed the 11 tools that we found through our search. In our review of tools, we first assessed if they included the risk and protective factors that we described above. Second, we assessed if they group factors using the levels that the SEM identifies. Third, we assessed if their objective contributed to our goal to better understand the risk for violence and migration in Honduras. We also assessed if the tools had been validated, if they had been applied in Honduras or similar contexts, and if their methodology of application seemed practical. We describe in more detail these other criteria below.

Status of Testing or Validating the Tool

We were especially interested in tools that have been tested or validated in the field. The testing and validation of the tool provides greater confidence that the factors that the tool includes are directly related to the outcomes it attempts to assess (Koetzle, Mellow, Piñol, & Pugliese, 2021). They also help to identify the effectiveness of the method of application. The validation or testing of the tool is an important consideration in our review as we want to make a final recommendation on the adaptation or adoption of a tool that will be effective and efficient.

Country of Application of the Tool

We were also looking for tools that had been validated or at least used in Honduras or similar contexts. Honduras is characterized by lower living standards, high crime rates, corrupt governments, and few guarantees of protection of fundamental human rights. In this context, we see structural violence and systems of exclusion playing a role to generate adverse circumstances for many families. Tools that have been developed for application in countries with similar contexts of violence and exclusion would be more appropriate for adaptation or to take contributions from. In our review, we also included the analysis of tools and tool kits developed to be applied in contexts with other characteristics. Although those tools might not qualify for adaptation to the Honduran context, important lessons can be learned from them, their development, and application.

Methodology of Application of the Tool

Through our review, we were also looking for tools with a methodology that would ensure the proper assessment of risk for violence and migration. First, we looked for tools with a methodology easy to replicate across regions and time. This would allow for the comparison of results and would imply lower costs, efficiency in analyzing results, and efficiency in time used in training staff to carry out the application of the tool. Furthermore, the methodology of application should include an organization of factors at the individual, household, community, and national (societal-structural) level. We found that the Socio-Ecological Model (SEM) provides a useful starting point for analyzing how the different factors that affect an individual's capabilities and intentions work through and across multiple scales. Lastly, we looked for tools with a methodology of application with mixed methods: survey, focused groups, and secondary data. These are all important components for a more complete and accurate understanding of the risk for violence and migration.

The criteria described will help us create a recommendation geared towards identifying a tool or toolkit that can be made or adapted to better understand the likelihood of individuals migrating or of households and communities sending more migrants. Additionally, the tool should also assess the likelihood of individuals staying put or of communities providing conditions in which people can stay put. Even if the results of the tool portray a higher likelihood for the individual to stay put, the tool should also assess in those cases the vulnerability to violence. All this would help us identify specific individuals, households, or communities where interventions should be targeted. This will result in more efficient and effective efforts for decreasing risks and increasing resiliency when working with limited resources.

TOOLS AND METHODS REVIEWED

All the criteria described above informed our search for tools for our analysis, which was a step of the review. Through our extensive research, we identified 11 tools and toolkits that seemed like good candidates for adapting or designing a tool to better understand the risk for violence and migration among youth in Honduras. To find the tools we searched online databases and requested sources from USAID and the American Institutes for Research (AIR). Additionally, we consulted and requested information from experts, practitioners, and representatives of 15 other organizations working on the issues of violence and migration in Honduras.

The 11 tools that we identified through our search were diverse and each of them met at least some of the criteria described above. We found tools such as Communities that Care (CTC) Australia, a long-term, comprehensive, risks and protective focused prevention strategy based on research of predictors of health and behavior problems (Cahir, et al., 2003). We also located the Victimization Assessment Toolkit (VAT) by *Médecins Sans Frontières*, this assessment aims to understand the problems, sources, and consequences of a situation to determine the most fitting response. This tool has already been used in Honduras to better detect and give attention to survivors of sexual violence (USAID, 2016).

Dialogos in Guatemala shared with us their work in the adaptation of the Development Assessment Profile (DAP) used to better understand the risk for violence and migration. Created by the Search Institute, DAP is a survey designed to establish a diagnosis of the well-being of an individual or group of people (World Vision, 2019). Through USAID in Honduras, we identified tools such as the *Instrumento de Medición de Comportamiento de Riesgo* (IMC), which assesses eligibility for prevention services of youth between 8 and 17 years old in Honduras.

Here is a chart with a brief description of all the 11 tools that we found best fit our criteria:

Name of the tool	Migration Propensity Index (MPI)[6]	Communities that Care (CTC)[7]	Development Assessment Profile (DAP)[8]
Objective of the tool	To provide an objective measure of the probability that individuals from a given household will migrate to a foreign country within the next 12 months.	To identify risk and protective factors associated with problem behaviors like substance abuse, delinquency, teen pregnancy, school dropout and violence in a very different context.	To establish a diagnosis of the wellbeing of a person or a group of people.
Status of testing or validation of the tool	Tested and statistically rigorous	Tested and validated	Tested and validated. Being adapted for violence and migration.
Country of application of the tool	Guatemala	Australia	Guatemala
Methodology – format of application	Surveys that are fed into an index with 12 variables	Mixed methods	Survey of 58 items
Methodology – grouping of factors (i.e., use of SEM model)	Variables are related to common drivers of emigration, not grouped by scale. However, the developers acknowledge that migration decisions are influenced by factors at the individual, household, local, regional and national level	Groups factors on domains: community, family, school, peer or individual.	Internal Elements and External Elements that influence the individual. Well-being is built around a dynamic relationship between the individual and the family, peers, school, community, and culture.
Methodology – time of application	Short 12 variable survey.	The CTC process is a long-term, comprehensive, risk and protective-focused prevention strategy based on research of	Around 1 hour.

[6] Ceballos & Hernandez, The Migration Propensity Index: An Application to Guatemala, 2020
[7] Cahir, et al., 2003
[8] World Vision, 2019

		predictors of health and behavior problems.	
RISK FACTORS			
Individual-household Level			
Direct victimization or victimization in the household.	Not included	Not included	Not included
Receiving remittances	Included	Not included	Not included
Age: 15-30	Included	Not included	Not included
Gender	Included	Not included	Not included
Direct experience of corruption	Not included	Not included	Not included
Low trust in government institutions	Not included	Not included	Not included
Subjective sense of not being where you want to be economically, not having enough opportunities	Not included	Not included	Not included
Food insecurity	Included	Not included	Not included
Community Level			
Living in a community with high crime rates or strong gang presence	Not included	Not included	Not included
Lack of employment opportunities	Not included	Not included	Not included
PROTECTIVE FACTORS			
Individual-household Level			

Feeling more connected to community	Included	Not included	Not included
More resilience	Not included	Not included	Not included
Education	Included	Not included	Not included
Having higher trust in government	Not included	Not included	Not included
Being active in church	Not included	Not included	Not included
Access to food and water	Included	Not Included	Not included
Community Level			
Low crime rate	Not included	Not included	Not included
More employment opportunities	Not included	Not included	Not included
Higher voter participation rates	Not included	Not included	Not included

Name of the tool	Instrumento de Medición del Comportamiento (IMC)[9]	International Organization for Migration Handbook[10]	Child and Youth Resilience Measure (CYRM)/Adult Resilience Measure (ARM)[11]
Objective of the tool	To identify youth at risk for presenting behavioral problems linked with crime.	To support case managers, service providers, communities, humanitarian and development actors, States and other actors working to provide protection and assistance to migrants vulnerable to violence, exploitation, and abuse.	To measure resilience among youth and adults.

[9] Katz, Cheon, Decker, & Stuewe-Portnoff, 2019

[10] International Organization for Migration, 2019

[11] Resilience Research Centre and Dahlhouse University, 2019

Status of testing or validation of the tool	Tested and validated	N/A	Various studies have provided information to help confirm the psychometric properties of the CYRM and the ARM.
Country of application of the tool	Honduras	N/A	Several, for different kinds of studies.
Methodology – format of application	Interview	N/A	Mixed methods: Surveys and focus groups
Methodology – grouping of factors (i.e., use of SEM model)	Domains – individual peers, school, family and community. 27 risk factors and 11 protective factors.	Individual Factors, Household and Family Factors, Community Factors and Structural Factors.	SEM
Methodology – time of application	45min – 1 hr.	N/A	10 mins
RISK FACTORS			
Individual-household Level			
Direct victimization or victimization in the household.	Not included	Included	Not included
Receiving remittances	Not included	Included	Not included
Age: 15-30	Included	Included	Not included
Gender	Not included	Not included	Not included
Direct experience of corruption	Not included	Not included	Not included
Low trust in government institutions	Not included	Not included	Not included
Subjective sense of not being where you want to be economically, not having enough opportunities	Included	Not included	Not included
Food insecurity	Not included	Included	Included

Community Level			
Living in a community with high crime rates/strong gang presence	Not included	Not included	Not included
Lack of employment opportunities	Not included	Not included	Not included
PROTECTIVE FACTORS			
Individual-household Level			
Feeling more connected to community	Included	Included	Included
More resilience	Included	Not included	Included
Education	Not included	Included	Not included
Having higher trust in government	Not included	Not included	Not included
Being active in church	Not included	Not included	Not included
Access to food and water	Not included	Included	Included
Community Level			
Low crime rate	Not included	Not included	Not included
More employment opportunities	Not included	Not included	Not included
Higher voter participation rates	Not included	Not included	Not included

Name of the tool	Victimization Assessment Tool (VAT)[12]	Violence-Involved Persons Risk Assessment (VIPRA)[13]	Social Capital And Social Cohesion Measurement Toolkit For Community

[12] Koscalova, 2012

[13] VIPRA, Encuesta de Seguimiento. (USAID, 2018)

			Driven Development Operations[14]
Objective of the tool	To understand a situation and identify the problems, their sources, and consequences as means to determine the best course of response.in the context of health and humanitarian crises.	To distinguish between primary risk individuals (persons who, despite living in areas with high levels of violence, exhibit few signs of violent behavior in their thoughts or actions, or have many protective assets and secondary risk individuals (persons that exhibit signs of violent behavior in either their thoughts or actions or do not have protective assets).	To facilitate the measurement of social capital and social cohesion, particularly in the context of evaluating Community-Driven Development (CDD) programs in settings affected by fragility, conflict, migration and forced displacement.
Status of testing or validation of the tool	Recommends triangulation, cross-checking of information, and reflection phases for validation of findings.	Tested and validated by NDIGD and faculty in the Notre Dame Department of Psychology.	Provides several preliminary notes to guide future piloting, validation, and analysis.
Country of application of the tool	Applicable to multiple contexts.	It has been used in Honduras.	Applicable to multiple contexts.
Methodology – format of application	Mixed methods: qualitative and quantitative.	Mixed methods: standardized questionnaires and interviews. Follow up after the first application.	A set of 15 survey questions that measure the conceptually relevant dimensions of social capital and social cohesion and a qualitative contextualization guide that can be used to adapt the survey module to an evaluation context.
Methodology – grouping of factors (i.e., use of SEM model)	Categorize risk factors can be distal, intermediate, or proximate. Understand vulnerability and related capacity at	It covers domains like personal history, emotional dimensions, relationship/community dimensions, and places these domains in the Social-Ecological	Measures social capital and social cohesion in different dimensions: relationships, resources, trust, collective action norms, belonging, identity, attitudes toward

[14] Kim, J., Sheely, R., Schmidt, C. (2020). Social Capital and Social Cohesion Measurement Toolkit for Community-Driven Development Operations. Washington, DC: Mercy Corps and The World Bank Group.

	each of those categories.	framework of violence prevention.	out-groups, and civic engagement.
Methodology – time of application	Duration of the assessment will depend on the context.	More than 200 questions.	-
RISK FACTORS			
Individual-household Level			
Direct victimization or victimization in the household.	Included	Included	Not included
Receiving remittances	Not Included	Included	Not included
Age: 15-30	Included	Included	Not included
Gender	Included	Included	Not included
Direct experience of corruption	Not included	Not included	Not included
Low trust in government institutions	Not included	Not included	Not included
Subjective sense of not being where you want to be economically, not having enough opportunities	Not included	Not included	Not included
Food insecurity	Included	Not included	Not included
Community Level			
Living in a community with high crime rates/strong gang presence	Not included	Not included	Not included
Lack of employment opportunities	Included	Included	Not included

PROTECTIVE FACTORS			
Individual-household Level			
Feeling more connected to community	Not included	Included	Included
More resilience	Not included	Included	Included
Education	Included	Included	Not included
Having higher trust in government	Not included	Not included	Not included
Being active in church	Not included	Not included	Not included
Access to food and water	Included	Not included	Not included
Community Level			
Low crime rate	Included	Not included	Not included
More employment opportunities	Included	Included	Not included
Higher voter participation rates	Not included	Not included	Not included

Name of the tool	Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment Initiative to Counter Violent Extremism (VRAI)[15]	Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET)[16][17]
Objective of the tool	To identify communities most vulnerable to recruitment by extremist groups.	To evaluate risk to engage with the ecosystem of gangs and violence.

[15] Simpson, 2020

[16] Hare, Guzman, & Miller-Graf, Identifying high-risk young adults for violence prevention: a validation of psychometric and social scales in Honduras, 2018

[17] Katz, Cheon, Decker, & Stuewe-Portnoff, 2019

Status of testing or validation of the tool	Recommends that a tool should be validated in a participatory way to ensure the relevance, appropriateness and feasibility of indicators, data collection and analysis methods outlined within the framework.	Adapted and validated for use in Honduras.
Country of application of the tool	Used in African countries.	Originally developed by the City of Los Angeles' Gang Reduction and Youth Development and adapted to use in Central America and Caribbean including Honduras.
Methodology – format of application	Various participatory community assessments	Survey, data collected through interview.
Methodology – grouping of factors (i.e., use of SEM model)	Individual, community, institutional, and contextual/environmental.	It covers domains like personal history, emotional dimensions, relationship/community dimensions, past deviance, and places these domains in the Social-Ecological Framework of violence prevention.
Methodology – time of application	-	Survey
RISK FACTORS		
Individual-household Level		
Direct victimization or victimization in the household.	Not included	Not included
Receiving remittances	Not included	Not included
Age: 15-30	Not included	Included
Gender	Not included	Included
Direct experience of corruption	Not included	Not included
Low trust in government institutions	Not included	Not included

Subjective sense of not being where you want to be economically, not having enough opportunities	Not included	Not included
Food insecurity	Not included	Not included
Community Level		
Living in a community with high crime rates or strong gang presence	Included	Included
Lack of employment opportunities	Not included	Not included
PROTECTIVE FACTORS		
Individual-household Level		
Feeling more connected to community	Included	Included
More resilience	Included	Included
Education	Not included	Not included
Having higher trust in government	Not included	Not included
Being active in church	Not included	Not included
Access to food and water	Vrai	Not included
Community Level		
Low crime rate	Not included	Included
More employment opportunities	Not included	Not included
Higher voter participation rates	Not included	Not included

THE MOST HELPFUL TOOL

Description of the MPI

After a thorough review of the 11 tools presented above, we believe that the Migration Propensity Index (MPI) applied in Guatemala is the tool that best fits the criteria established to assess risk for violence and migration in Honduras. The MPI includes many of the risk and protective factors we describe above. The tool has also been validated, used in a context that is very similar to Honduras, and uses a methodology that should be easily adapted to Honduras. As a result, we recommend using the MPI as the foundation for creating a tool to assess risk for violence and migration in Honduras. However, we also believe that some of the other tools reviewed offer contributions that would strengthen the MPI. Below, we first describe the MPI tool in more detail, then explain why we believe it is the best tool available as well as some of its weaknesses. Finally, we describe the aspects we like from other tools which we believe would make the MPI even stronger.

The MPI was developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute in Guatemala. The main objective of the tool is to estimate a household's propensity or probability to emigrate. The MPI puts together an index with a set of household-level indicators related to the decision of individuals to migrate. The developers of the MPI worked with a panel data set of households in Guatemala collected using a survey during three different rounds between 2012 and 2014. The surveys were applied to 176 municipalities in Guatemala with acute and chronic malnutrition, food insecurity, prevalence of poverty, lack of access to basic services, and lack of market accessibility (Ceballos & Hernandez, 2020). The survey also focused on households with children under five years of age and women of childbearing age. From the 176 municipalities, a subsample of 60 was used to develop the index.

The available panel data and statistical regression techniques facilitated a quantitative analysis to create the MPI. Considering all the information collected in the surveys and available through the panel's data set, the developers of the MPI first constructed a broad set of variables that could potentially be correlated with the decision to emigrate by an individual or household. "These include a total of 48 variables related to household socioeconomic characteristics and composition, dwelling materials, access to services, assets, landholdings and agricultural activities, expenditures, participation in social programs, climate vulnerability, whether someone emigrated during the past year, incoming remittances and geographic location" (Ceballos & Hernandez, 2020). The variables were considered under the framework of local (push) factors and external (pull) factors. Finally, through "widely used" statistical regression techniques, twelve variables were carefully selected to complete the MPI.

Some of the key attributes of the MPI are that it is concise, statistically rigorous, and simple. This contributes to target donors, policymakers, and program implementers becoming users of the index (Ceballos & Hernandez, 2020). The tool is concise as it only comprises twelve variables that are easy to measure and reduce reporting bias. These questions could even be asked over the phone. The MPI is statistically rigorous as different cross-evaluation techniques were used to make sure it had a predictive capacity. Finally, the tool is simple as it focuses on certain key variables and does not use overly complex regression techniques.

The proposed model in the MPI has shown to correctly predict about 50% of household members who end up migrating and around 95% of cases where members of a household do not emigrate (Ceballos & Hernandez, 2020). This is a good predictive performance. The MPI identifies a non-emigrating household in 19 out of 20 households. Furthermore, the MPI has created a scoring system that classifies households depending on their risk or propensity to emigrate.

The Best Tool Identified

After a thorough review of the 11 tools presented above, we believe that the Migration Propensity Index (MPI) applied in Guatemala is the tool that best fits the criteria established to assess risk for violence and migration in Honduras. The MPI includes many of the risk and protective factors we describe above, the tool has been validated, used in a context that is very similar to Honduras, and uses a methodology that should be easily adapted to Honduras. As a result, we recommend using the MPI as the foundation for creating a tool to assess the risk for violence and migration in Honduras. Below, we more fully describe the MPI tool and then explain why we believe it is the best tool available.

The MPI already includes some of the factors we have identified and organizes them into levels. The tool includes five out of the ten risk factors and three out of the nine protective factors we previously identified to be related to risk for violence and migration. In this way, the tool acknowledges that there are factors "negatively" related to risk for migration while others are "positively" related.

The MPI also considers that "migration decisions are generally influenced by many factors at the individual, household, local, regional, and national level, a finding with which we agree. As we have found that a structure such as the Socio-Ecological Model (SEM) can clarify how different factors can interact to influence capabilities and intentions to migrate. Furthermore, "if representative household data is available across broader areas (e.g., communities, municipalities, departments, and regions) the index can be aggregated at the area-level for geographic targeting purposes" (Ceballos & Hernandez, 2020). This echoes

our findings regarding the importance of collecting data not only at the individual-household level, but also at the community and national level.

The MPI has been validated and applied to contexts like those in Honduras showing predictive capabilities. Furthermore, its simplicity, conciseness and statistical rigor were attributes we were seeking in a tool. The success of the tool indicates that, with some adjustments, it will also be effective in measuring the risk for violence and migration in Honduras. Its practical methodology also makes the tool easy to replicate across regions and time. This would result in efficient use of resources and time to collect data, analyze results and work towards better assisting individuals at risk of violence and migration.

Improvements to the MPI

Through our review, we identified the MPI as the tool that, if adopted, would be the most effective to measure the risk of violence and migration in Honduras. The MPI was created to predict the risk for migration within 12 months. Through our study, we have tried to identify a tool to best assess not just the risk for migration but also for violence. That is one of the main reasons why we recommend adjustments and additions to the MPI. First, all the tool's indicators and variables would need to be re-evaluated using the Capabilities-Intentions Framework instead of just push-pull factors logic. It is also important that those factors are grouped using the SEM model. Furthermore, the collection of information and the analysis of the data through mixed methods would also improve the MPI or a version of it applied in Honduras.

Indicators

Using the MPI in Honduras would require incorporating new variables and indicators considering all of the factors we found to be related to risk for violence and migration. This includes choosing factors using the Capabilities-Intentions Framework instead of just a push-pull factors logic. The below table with factors that we identified using the Capabilities-Intentions Framework shows which ones are already included in the MPI and which are not.

RISK FACTORS	
Individual-household Level	
Direct victimization or victimization in the household.	Not included

Receiving remittances	Included
Age: 15-30	Included
Gender	Included
Direct experience of corruption	Not included
Low trust in government institutions	Not included
Subjective sense of not being where you want to be economically, not having enough opportunities	Not included
Food insecurity	Included
Community Level	
Living in a community with high crime rates/strong gang presence	Not included
Lack of employment opportunities	Not included
PROTECTIVE FACTORS	
Individual-household Level	
Feeling more connected to community	Included
More resilience	Not included
Education	Included
Having higher trust in government	Not included
Being active in church	Not included
Access to food and water	Included
Community Level	
Low crime rate	Not included
More employment opportunities	Not included
Higher voter participation rates	Not included

Using the SEM Model

The variables in the MPI are related to common drivers of emigration in general, not grouped by scale. However, the developers acknowledge that migration decisions are influenced by factors at the individual, household, local, regional, and national levels. A better version of the MPI should group variables on the factors related to risk for violence and migration at the different levels identified through the Socio-Ecological Model. The results of the tool should indicate an individual household or community risk for both outcomes. In this study, we have already provided an initial list of factors that should be included.

Methodology

The MPI in Guatemala relied solely on data gathered through household surveys. It used surveys that were fed into an index with 12 variables. We propose that an adaptation of this in Honduras includes further components to better target vulnerable populations. Surveys, focus groups, collective analysis of survey data at the community level, secondary source material, public data and scholarly research at the national (societal-structural) level are all important components for a more complete and accurate understanding of risk for violence and migration.

Including a participatory method in the design will make it useful not only to academics, policymakers, and project funders, but to the communities themselves as they seek to address the issues that have made youth vulnerable to both violence and risky migration. Participatory action research can help identify individuals, households, and communities where interventions should be prioritized and the vulnerabilities that need to be addressed because community members have information that outsiders may not always have access to. However, it is important to consider that using participatory methods could be tricky and dangerous, especially when exploring factors related to violence victimization. Both the ARM and VRAI tools engage communities in the collection and analysis of data not only to ensure the quality but also to provide input and buy-in from the community for program and policy design at the start of any intervention (Resilience Research Centre, 2019). Subsequently, the community can contribute to analyzing what worked and what needs changing as programs and policies evolve. This method can directly contribute to the generation of proposed actions to address some of the vulnerabilities that the communities themselves identify. Further analysis is necessary to define how to do this well.

NATIONAL (SOCIETAL-STRUCTURAL) LEVEL FACTORS

In addition to the individual-household and community-level factors we describe above, the decision to migrate takes place in the context of national and structural circumstances. Statistics at that level about violence, corruption and other indicators are important as well as statistics on the perception of those factors and hope or lack thereof that they will improve. We also need to monitor data that has generated useful information on who migrates and from where. We will need to cross that with other accessible data on crime that will help identify regional and macro trends. Before the adaptation of the MPI, this study should serve as a basis for the factors found to be connected to violence and migration at the national level.

It is important that data at the societal-structural level is gathered in addition to what is collected at the individual-household and community level. At this level, the data should come principally from **secondary sources** that will remain consistently available. There are concerns about the reliability of crime data, as well as other data sources in Honduras. For this reason, it is important to include several data sources as indicators of factors like those we listed at the individual-household and community level. In other words, factors that, in the context of capabilities-intentions model, will impact the risk of violence and migration.

Based on the literature review, the data analyzed, and the indicators available about Honduras, below we present a list of items that should be monitored at the national level. Most of these factors are already mentioned as risk and protective factors at the community level above, here we want to point out the importance of looking at how those change at the national level. This can serve as an additional red flag in identifying capabilities and intentions to migrate or in response to the risk of violence.

Following the Capabilities-Intentions Framework, we list again some of the factors we identified at the community level. Based on the framework and the data available in Honduras, we also list new factors. For example, on security and victim protection, we list impunity. From the Capabilities-Intentions Framework, this factor allows the assessment of the capabilities to respond to violence victimization which could have implications on the intention to migrate. We also list other factors that help to monitor changes in migration patterns. These include data on mobility and deportation. Finally, we list other economic factors, like poverty and inequality. This might portray macro changes in capabilities and intentions among the Honduran population.

Domain	Factor	Indicator/Data Source
Political	Participation	Voting rates by age and gender
	Confidence in Institutions	National opinion polls regarding confidence overall and specifically in criminal justice system
	Corruption	AmericasBarometer data
Security and Victim protection	Crime rates for homicides, feminicides, threats, extortion, sexual assault, and domestic violence	Police and judicial records of reported crimes
	Victimization and underreporting	Victim surveys
	Impunity	Conviction rate for violent crimes: homicides, feminicides, threats, extortion, sexual assault, and domestic violence
Migration	Mobility	Mapping migration flows
	Remittances	Mapping remittances
	Deportations/Return in need of Protection	
Economy	Poverty	Poverty and extreme poverty rates (INE) compared with migration flows by geographic region, gender and age
	Inequality	
	Employment	Formal employment rates compared with migration flows by geographic region, gender and age

LESSONS FROM OTHER TOOLS REVIEWED

Some of the tools we reviewed were not found to be appropriate for adaptation or application in the Honduran context, but still provided ideas for useful components to be considered. The Communities that Care (CTC) tool, for instance, provides useful suggestions for organization and conceptualization (Cahir, et al., 2003). The tool addresses the factors that increase the likelihood of positive development and decreases the likelihood of adverse outcomes for children and young people. On the other hand, the IMC tool can teach us a lot about the adaptation and application process in Honduras, given that it derives from a tool used in another context (Katz, Cheon, Decker, & Stuewe-Portnoff, 2019). However, besides potential information on a broader understanding of the different sorts of violence that might impact an individual, the IMC does comprehend factors that would allow us to measure the risk for violence and migration. Lastly, the CYRM/ARM tool may provide

important contributions to better understand how to measure the protective factor of resiliency (Resilience Research Centre, 2019). Through those tools, resiliency is understood as a socio-ecological construct. Integrating parts of this tool to an adapted MPI in Honduras would most likely strengthen the understanding of the impact of resiliency as a protective factor for violence and migration.

CONCLUSION

Through this section of the study, we have developed a recommendation for a tool or tools that will help to better assess the risk for violence and migration in Honduras. The tool recommended will successfully identify individuals, households, and communities in need of assistance to reduce their risk of violence and migration. This will contribute to reducing the suffering that Honduran families experience given harsh circumstances that have left them with two difficult options: migrate and attempt to find a more promising future or stay put and be victimized by violence.

The Capabilities-Intentions Framework and the Socio-Ecological Model presented in section one and the findings from the quantitative data reviewed in the previous section allowed us to build a rubric of criteria to review several tools and methods and to identify the one that best fits our objectives. By clearly identifying risk and protective factors shown to be connected to the risk for violence and migration and defining important methodological considerations, we were able to complete our review and find the best tool. The tool identified and explored should serve as the foundation to create a toolset that will work in the Honduran context.

After evaluating 11 tools, we reached the conclusion that the Migration Propensity Index (MPI) is the most appropriate evidence-based tool in its relevance for academic researchers as well as practitioners and policy makers. This tool adapted to a Honduran context would allow for the collection of more data to understand why some individuals are more likely to be impacted by violence or to migrate and as a result, will help to better design, direct, and evaluate interventions to reduce the risk for violence and migration.

FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The Migration Propensity Index as applied in Guatemala should be adapted to develop a tool to assess risk for violence and migration in Honduras. The thorough statistical approach used in its design should be replicated in adapting the tool for Honduras. Adaptation of the MPI for Honduras should reevaluate the indicators already included in the tool and add new

ones based on the Capabilities-Intentions Framework and the data analysis we have presented in this study. Once that has been done, it will be necessary to test the tool with focus groups and through a pilot to make sure it is ready to be tried in a broader sample of the population. The new tool must include consideration of factors at the individual-household, community and national level. Furthermore, the incorporation of complementary qualitative tools should be considered, such as interviews and focus groups, to discuss issues and preliminary findings with the communities.

Our review of risk and protective factors for violence and migration, considering the Capabilities-Intentions Framework and the data analyzed, has provided important methodological considerations for using the tool. First, considering the risk and protective factors at the community and national level will facilitate the selection of samples. It will help to identify communities most at risk, where we can further assess who are the individuals-households that might need assistance to decrease the risk for violence and migration. Further analysis is needed to determine who will help gather the data and analyze the results. In deciding this, it is important to consider the importance of collecting unbiased data, but also the safety of those aiding in the process.

We recommend a regular (yearly) application of the tool or tools. This is important to aid researchers in better understanding the risk for violence and migration, but also to provide helpful information to policymakers and practitioners. By regularly applying a tool or tools like those we propose, we can evaluate if the tool is effective at demonstrating risk for violence and migration. Regular use of these tools would help decision makers identify who and where are the population where the risk for violence and migration is increasing and why. This would in turn guide new policies and interventions. Furthermore, this would help policy makers and practitioners evaluate if current policies and interventions are working in reducing risk for violence and migration.

In the end, the most important recommendation is the relevance of developing a tool focused on aiding vulnerable populations in Honduras. A new tool or tools should decrease risk factors that do not allow people to live a life without fear and with opportunities for growth. Furthermore, it should help increase protective factors in the face of challenges. The goal is a Honduras with communities and households that provide an environment in which vulnerable individuals experience less violence, more security, more economic opportunities, and better health and education services. An effective tool to assess the risk for violence and migration should help create settings where people can better flourish as individuals and in community.

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